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Abstract. We propose a Dolev-Yao-based definition of abuse freeness
for optimistic contract-signing protocols which, unlike other definitions,
incorporates a rigorous notion of what it means for an outside party to
be convinced by a dishonest party that it has the ability to determine the
outcome of the protocol with an honest party, i.e., to determine whether
it will obtain a valid contract itself or whether it will prevent the honest
party from obtaining a valid contract. Our definition involves a new no-
tion of test (inspired by static equivalence) which the outside party can
perform. We show that an optimistic contract-signing protocol proposed
by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner is abusive and that a protocol by Garay,
Jakobsson, and MacKenzie is abuse-free according to our definition. Our
analysis is based on a synchronous concurrent model in which parties can
receive several messages at the same time. This results in new vulnera-
bilities of the protocols depending on how a trusted third party reacts in
case it receives abort and resolve requests at the same time.
1 Introduction
Abuse-freeness is a security property introduced in [10] for optimistic contract-
signing protocols: An optimistic (two-party) contract-signing protocol is a pro-
tocol run by A (Alice), B (Bob), and a trusted third party T (TTP) to exchange
signatures on a previously agreed upon contractual text with the additional
property that the TTP will only be involved in a run in case of problems. Such
a protocol is not abuse-free for (honest) Alice if at some point during a protocol
run (dishonest) Bob can “convince” an outside party C (Charlie) that he is in an
unbalanced state, where, following the terminology of [5], unbalanced means that
Bob has both (i) a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a valid contract and
(ii) a strategy to obtain a valid contract. In other words, Alice can be misused
by Bob to get leverage for another contract (with Charlie). Obviously, abuse-free
contract-signing protocols are highly desirable.
The main goal of the present work is to present a formal definition of abuse-
freeness which is as protocol-independent as possible. The crucial issue with such
a formal definition is that it needs to specify what it means for Bob to convince
Charlie. One of the first proposals for this was presented by Kremer and Raskin
[12]. Roughly, their proposal is the following: to convince Charlie a message is
presented to Charlie from which he can deduce that “a protocol run has been
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started between Alice and Bob”. What that means is, however, not specified in
a general fashion in [12]. Instead, this is decided on a case by case basis. The
objective of this paper is to give a generic definition. The only part which needs
to be decided on a case by case basis in our definition is what it means for
Alice (or Bob) to have received a valid contract, something which can hardly be
described in a generic way, and what the assumptions are that Charlie makes.
Before we explain our approach and the contribution of our work we need to
explain the following crucial point: Whether or not Charlie is convinced should
be based on evidence provided by Bob. Following [10], we model this evidence
as a message that Bob presents to Charlie. (In [10], this is called an off-line
attack.) This, however, has an important implication. Since Bob can hold back
any message he wants to (he can himself decide which messages he shows to
Charlie) and since Charlie is assumed to be an outside party not involved in the
protocol, if Bob could convince Charlie to be in some state of the protocol at
some point, at any later point he would be able to convince Charlie that he was
in the same state, just by providing the same evidence. Therefore, Bob can only
convince Charlie that he is or was and still might be in an unbalanced state.
We employ this notion of abuse-freeness for our work. Note that this notion is
stronger than the one described at the beginning (since Charlie is more easily
convinced). Hence, a protocol secure w.r.t. the version of abuse-freeness just
explained is also secure w.r.t. that version.
Contribution of this Work. We provide a formal definition of the version of
abuse-freeness just explained, apply our definition to the optimistic contract-
signing protocols by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner [3] (ASW protocol) and by
Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie [10] (GJM protocol), and show, as one would
expect, that the ASW protocol is abusive while the GJM protocol is abuse-free
according to our definition.
The idea behind our definition of abuse-freeness is that Bob presents a mes-
sage to Charlie and Charlie performs a certain test on this message. If the mes-
sage passes the test, then Charlie is convinced that Bob is or was and still might
be in an unbalanced state. The test is such that from the point of view of Charlie,
Bob can only generate messages passing the test in states where Bob is or was in
an unbalanced state and where at least one of these states is in fact unbalanced.
To describe the power Bob has, we adopt a Dolev-Yao style approach [9] (see
also [2, 1, 8]). Our definition of test is inspired by the notion of static equivalence
[2].
We use a synchronous concurrent communication model in which principals
and the (Dolev-Yao-style) intruder may send several messages to different parties
at the same time. This rather realistic model requires to specify the behavior
of protocol participants in case several messages are received at the same time
(or within one time slot). This leads to new effects that have not been observed
in previous works. In the ASW and GJM protocols, one needs to specify the
behavior of the TTP in case an abort and a resolve request are received at the
same time (from different parties). The question arises whether the TTP should
answer with an abort or a resolve request. We show that if the TTP does the
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former, then the ASW and the GJM protocol are unbalanced for the responder,
and in the other case, they are unbalanced for the initiator.
Related Work. As mentioned above, Kremer et al. [12] analyze the ASM and
GJM protocol based on finite-state alternating transition systems, using an au-
tomatic analysis tool. They explicitly need to specify the behavior of dishonest
principals and which states are the ones that are convincing to Charlie (they
use a propositional variable prove2C, which they set manually). This is what our
definition makes obsolete.
Chadha et al. [5] introduce a stronger notion than abuse-freeness, namely
balance: For a protocol to be unbalanced one does not require Bob to convince
Charlie that he is in an unbalanced state. The fact that an unbalanced state
exists is sufficient for a protocol to be unbalanced. Hence, balance is a formally
stronger notion than abuse-freeness. Unfortunately, this notion is too strong in
some cases. In fact, under certain conditions balance is impossible to achieve [7].
In [6], Chadha et al. also study multi-party contract signing protocols.
Shmatikov and Mitchell [13] employ the finite-state model checker Murφ to
automatically analyze contract-signing protocols. They, too, approximate the
notion of abuse-freeness by a notion similar to balance.
Structure of the Paper. The technical part of the report starts with an informal
description of the ASW and GJM protocols in Sect. 2. The ASW protocol then
serves as a running example for the further definitions. In Sect. 4, we describe
our communication and protocol model, with background given in Section 3. In
Sect. 5 we present our new definition of abuse-freeness. We then treat the ASW
and the GJM protocol in our framework in Sect. 6 and Sect. 7. We conclude in
Section 8.
2 The ASW and the GJM protocol
In this section, we recall the two contract-signing protocols which we use to ex-
plain our framework and which we analyze within that framework: the Asokan-
Shoup-Waidner (ASW) protocol from [3] and the Garay-Jakobsson-MacKenzie
(GJM) protocol from [10]. Both of them are optimistical contract-signing proto-
cols, which means that a trusted third party gets involved only if a participant
deviates from the regular course of actions. This makes these protocols efficient
on the one hand, but complicated to analyse on the other hand.
As will be explained below, the ASW protocol, which uses conventional cryp-
tographic means, is not abuse-free [10]. As a remedy, the authors of that paper
suggested a new cryptographic primitive, a so-called “private contract signa-
ture”, and a new protocol, the so-called GJM protocol.
2.1 The ASW protocol
The protocol assumes the following scenario: Alice (A) and Bob (B) want to
sign a contract and Tom (T ) will serve as a trusted third party in the network.
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Further, it is agreed upon in the network that the following two types of messages
will be recognized as valid contracts between Alice and Bob with contractual text
SC = 〈me1, NA,me2, NB〉 , RC = sigT (〈me1,me2〉) ,
where me1 and me2 are defined by
me1 = sigA(〈A,B, T, text, hash(NA)〉) , me2 = sigB(〈me1, hash(NB)〉) .
Here, as usual, NA and NB stand for nonces. In addition to SC and RC, the
variants of SC and RC which one obtains by exchanging the roles of A and B are
regarded as valid contracts. Messages of type SC are called standard contracts,
while messages of type RC are called replacement contracts.
There are three interdependent parts to the protocol: an exchange protocol,
an abort protocol, and a resolve protocol. The exchange protocol consists of four
steps, which, in Alice-Bob notation, are as follows:
A→ B : me1 (E1)
B → A : me2 (E2)
A→ B : NA (E3)
B → A : NB (E4)
In other words, me1 and me2 serve as respective promises of Alice and Bob to
sign the contract and NA and NB serve as contract authenticators : after they
have been revealed, Alice and Bob can compose the standard contract SC.
The abort protocol is used by Alice to abort the contract signing process
when it does not receive Bob’s promise within a reasonable period of time. Alice
will obtain an abort receipt or, if the protocol instance has already been resolved
(see below), a replacement contract:
A→ T : ma1 := sigA(〈aborted,me1〉) (A1)
T → A : if DB(me1) = (resolved, s), then
s (A2.1)
else
DB(me1) := (aborted, sigT (aborted,ma1)); sigT (〈aborted,ma1〉)
(A2.2)
where DB(me1) denotes the entry for the promise me1 in T ’s database, which is
used by T to keep track of aborted and resolved protocol instances. In the nota-
tion we adopt the convention that the last expression of a sequence of expressions
determines the result of evaluating the sequence.
The resolve protocol can be used by Alice or Bob to resolve the protocol,
which either results in a replacement contract or, if the protocol has already
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been abortet, in an abort receipt:
B → T : 〈me1,me2〉 (R1)
T → B : if DB(me1) = (aborted, s), then
s (R2.1)
else
DB(me1) := (resolved, sigT (〈me1,me2〉)); sigT (〈me1,me2〉) (R2.2)
The same protocol (with roles of A and B exchanged) is also used by Alice when
she wants to resolve the protocol after she has already received Bob’s promise.
It is assumed that the communication between Alice and the TTP and be-
tween Bob and the TTP goes through a channel that is not under the control
of the intruder (the dishonest party), i.e., the intruder cannot delay, modify, or
insert messages. We refer to such a channel as secure. Whether or not the in-
truder can read messages sent on this channel does not effect the results shown
in this paper.
2.2 The GJM protocol
The GJM protocol is similar to the ASW protocol with regard to its general
structure: it consists of an exchange subprotocol, an abort subprotocol, and a
resolve subprotocol. To guarantee abuse-freeness, however, the protocol uses so-
called “private contract signatures” rather than universally verifiable signatures.
Specifically, a private contract signature pcsigA(m,B, T ) by A for B and with
trusted third party T is designed in such a way that: (i) it could also have been
generated by B (which means it cannot be used by B to convince Charlie that A
has been involved), (ii) A can convert it into a universally verifiable signature on
m by running s-convA(·) on it, and (iii) T can do the same by running t-convA(·)
on it. With these new primitives, the protocol can be described.
The GJM exchange subprotocol is:
A→ B : me1 := pcsigA(text, B, T )
B → A : me2 := pcsigB(text, A, T )
A→ B : s-convA(me1)
B → A : s-convB(me2)
It is similar in spirit to the ASW exchange protocol: Alice and Bob first ex-
change promises and then authenticators; a standard contract is of the form
〈s-convA(me1), s-convB(me2)〉.
The abort subprotocol is given by
A→ T : ma1 := sigA(〈text, A,B, aborted〉)
T → A : if DB(text) = (resolved, , s), then
s
else
DB(text) := (aborted, A, sigT (ma1)); sigT (ma1))
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The resolve subprotocol for B is given by
B → T : 〈me1,ms := s-convB(pcsigB(text, A, T ))〉
T → B : case DB(text) of
| (aborted, A, s)⇒ s
| (resolved, A, s)⇒ s
| ⇒ t-convT (me1)
while Alice’s resolve protocol is given by
A→ T : 〈me2,ms := s-convA(pcsigA(text, B, T ))〉
T → A : case DB(text) of
| (aborted, A, s)⇒ s
| (resolved, B, s)⇒ s
| ⇒ t-convT (me2)
From this, it becomes clear that a replacement contract has the same format as
the standard with only one difference, either s-convA(·) or s-convB(·) is replaced
by t-convT (·).
3 Background on Messages, Terms, and Derivation of
Messages
Along the lines of [1, 2, 8], we define messages, terms, and the way new mes-
sages can be derived from a given set of messages. Properties of cryptographic
operators are defined by equational theories.
3.1 Messages and Terms
A signature Σ is a set of function symbols where each symbol f ∈ Σ is associated
with a non-negative integer nf , the arity of f . As usual, elements c ∈ Σ with
nc = 0 are called constants. A signature Σ may contain a (countably) infinite
number of constants but only a finite number of non-constant function symbols.
Example 1 (ASW signature). For the ASW protocol in Section 6, we will use
the following signature:
ΣASW = {sig(·, ·), sigcheck(·, ·, ·), pk(·), sk(·), 〈·, ·〉, π1(·), π2(·), hash(·),
A,B, T, text, ok, initiator, responder,
resolved, aborted} ∪ C
where C denotes an infinite set of constants (disjoint from the other constants
defined in Σ). The function symbol sig(·, ·) models signatures, sigcheck(·, ·, ·) will
be used to check the validity of a signature, pk(·) and sk(·) model public and
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private keys, respectively, 〈·, ·〉 is the pairing symbol, π1(·) and π2(·) yield the
first and second component of a pair, respectively, and hash(·) models the hash.
The remaining symbols are constants.
Let V denote a (countably infinite) set of variables. The set T (Σ,V) of Σ-
terms (or simply terms) over V is inductively defined as follows:
1. V ⊆ T (Σ,V),
2. f(t1, . . . , tnf ) ∈ T (Σ,V) for each f ∈ Σ and every choice t1, . . . , tnf ∈
T (Σ,V).
The set of variables occurring in t is denoted by V(t).
A term without variables is called ground. The set of ground terms is denoted
by T (Σ).
The size |t| of a term t ∈ T (Σ,V) is defined inductively as follows: |c| = 1 and
|x| = 1 for all constansts c and variables x, and |f(t1, . . . , tn)| = 1+|t1|+· · ·+|tn|.
For a term t of the form f(t1, . . . , tn), we refer to f as the root symbol of t
and denote it by root(t).
The set of positions Pos(t) of a term t is inductively defined as follows:
Pos(c) = Pos(x) = {ε} for every constant c ∈ Σ and variable x ∈ V and
Pos(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = {ε} ∪
⋃n
i=1 i · Pos(ti) where ‘·’ denotes concatenation. For
example, Pos(〈text, sig(sk(A), text)〉) = {ε, 1, 2, 21, 211, 22}.
For p ∈ Pos(t), we denote by t|p the subterm of t rooted at position p. That is,
t|ε = t and f(t1, . . . , tn)|i·p = ti|p. For example, 〈text, sig(sk(A), text)〉|211 = A.
We denote by Sub(t) = {t|p | p ∈ Pos(t)} the set of subterms of t. Analo-
gously, Sub(T ) =
⋃
t∈T Sub(t) for a set T of terms.
A (ground) substitution assigns (ground) terms to variables. The domain of
a substitution is denoted by dom(σ) and is defined by dom(σ) = {x ∈ V | σ(x) 6=
x}. Substitutions are required to have finite domains.
Given two substitutions σ and τ with disjoint domains, their union σ ∪ τ
is defined in the obvious way. Given a term t, the term tσ is obtained from
t by simultaneously substituting each variable x occurring in t by σ(x). For
substitutions σ and τ we define the substitution στ by στ(x) = τ(σ(x)) for
every x.
For terms t, t1, . . . , tn, we denote by t[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn] the term tσ with
σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn}.
3.2 Equational Theories
A pair (s, t) ∈ T (Σ,V) × T (Σ,V) is called a Σ-identity (or simply identity).
Identities will be written as l = r. We call l the left-hand side (lhs) and r the
right-hand side (rhs) of the identity l = r.
We call a set of Σ-identities an equational theory over Σ (or simply an equa-
tional theory).
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Example 2 (ASW equational theory). For the ASW protocol in Section 6, we
will use the equational theory HASW, consisting of the following three identities:
sigcheck(x, sig(sk(y), x), pk(y)) = ok , (1)
π1(〈x, y〉) = x , (2)
π2(〈x, y〉) = y . (3)
An equational theoryH (overΣ) induces a reduction relation →H ⊆ T (Σ,V)
×T (Σ,V) as follows: s →H t if there exist (l, r) ∈ H, p ∈ Pos(s), and a sub-
stitution σ such that s|p = σ(l) and t = s[σ(r)]p where s[t]p denotes the term
constructed from s by replacing the term at position p in s by term t.
We denote by
∗→H the reflexive transitiv closure of →H, and by ∗↔H the
reflexive, symmetric, and transitive closure of →H. Instead of t ∗↔H s we write
t ≡H s (or simply t ≡ s) and say that t and s are equivalent (w.r.t. H).
Following common terminology [4], →H is call confluent if for every t, t1, t1
with t
∗→H t1 and t ∗→H t2 there exists t′ such that t1 ∗→H t′ and t2 ∗→H t′.
Moreover,→H is call terminating if there do not exist t0, t1, . . . such that t0 ∗→H
t1
∗→H · · · . The reduction relation→H is called convergent if it is both confluent
and terminating.
A term t ∈ T (Σ,V) is called reduced or irreducible (w.r.t. H) if t ∗→H t′
implies that t = t′ for all t′ ∈ T (Σ,V). We also say that t is in normal form.
We call t′ a normal form of t (w.r.t. H) if t ∗↔H t′ and t′ is in normal form.
If t′ is uniquely determined, we denote t′ by t↓ and call it the normal form of
t. For K ⊆ T (Σ,V), we set K↓= {m↓| m ∈ K} if all terms in K have uniquely
determined normal forms. For the equational theories we consider in this paper,
normal forms will always be uniquely determined.
The following is well-known (see, e.g., [4]):
Lemma 1. If →H is convergent, then:
1. Every t has a normal form w.r.t. →H.
2. t ≡H s iff t↓= s↓ for every t and s.
It is easy to see that →H with H defined as in Example 2 is convergent.
Hence, every term has a unique normal form w.r.t. H. For example, with m =
〈text, sig(sk(A), text)〉, we have that sigcheck(π1(m), π2(m), pk(A))↓= ok.
For an equational theorie H such that →H is convergent we call elements
from T (Σ)↓ messages and denote the set of messages by M.
3.3 Deriving Messages
New messages can be derived from a given set of messages by iteratively applying
cryptographic operations to the messages in the given set (and then normalizing
the resulting messages). Here, operations are modeled as terms and applying an
operation means substituting the variables.
A set S is called a set of operations if S ⊆ T (Σ,V).
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Example 3 (ASW operations). For the ASW protocol, we need operations that
model pairing, projections, using a public key, checking a signature, signing and
hashing:
SASW = {〈x1, x2〉, π1(x1), π2(x1), sigcheck(x1, x2, x3), sig(x2, x1), hash(x1)}
Given a set S of operations, we first define S-terms, which model that op-
erations from S can be applied iteratively. Let V ′ be a set of variables disjoint
from Σ ∪ V . The set of S-terms (w.r.t. V ′) is the smallest subset of T (Σ,V ′)
satisfying the following three conditions:
– each x ∈ V ′ is an S-term,
– each t ∈ S ∩ T (Σ) is an S-term, and
– for each t ∈ S with V(t) = {x1, . . . , xn} and for each choice t1, . . . , tn of
S-terms, the term t[t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn] is an S-term.
Now, assume that we are given a set K of ground terms. If t is an S-term and
σ is a substitution of the variables in t by elements of K, we call tσ a K-instance
of t.
Next, let H be some fixed equational theory for Σ. We define
dS(K) = {m↓| m is an (S ∪ K)-term without variables}
to be the set of messages (in normal form) that can be derived from K using S.
We fix one variable x′ ∈ V ′. An S-term N is called simple if V(N) ⊆ {x′}, that
is, if a variable occurs in t, then it must be x′.
Note that
dS(K) = dS∪K(∅). (4)
The reason why we separate S and K is that S is typically fixed and K frequently
changes. (An agent applies a fixed set of operations, defined by S, to the messages
in its current knowledge K.)
As an example, consider the signature Σ and the equational theory H as
defined in Example 1 and 2, and let K = {〈text, sig(sk(A), text)〉} and S =
{sig(y, x), π1(x), π2(y), sk(B)}. Then, sig(sk(B), text) ∈ dS(K) since with the S-
term s = sig(z2, π1(z1)) and the substitution σ = {z1 7→ 〈text, sig(sk(A), text)〉,
z2 7→ sk(B)} we have that (sσ)↓= sig(sk(B), text).
4 The Concurrent Protocol and Intruder Model
In this section, we introduce our protocol and intruder model. As mentioned
in the introduction, unlike most other (Dolev-Yao based) models, our model
captures real concurrent computation in the sense that at the same time many
agents (adversary and principals) can be active and many messages can be sent
to several agents. More precisely: every honest instance of a protocol is modeled
by a seperate automaton with input and output ports; the intruder together with
the dishonest instances is an automaton by itself; every output port is connected
to at most one input port (of another instance); communication proceeds in
rounds. In every round, every automaton does the following:
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1. It reads the input on all its input ports.
2. Depending on the input read and its current state, it writes output on one
or more of the output ports and updates its current state.
Output written on a port connected to an input port will be read in the next
round by the agent connected to this input port.
Our definition proceeds in two steps. We first define a general notion of concur-
rent system and then go over to cryptographic systems, which, in our context,
will be called Dolev-Yao systems.
A note on notation. For sets A and B we denote by AB the set of all mappings
from B to A. Given C ⊆ B and f ∈ AB , we denote by f |C the restriction of f
to C.
4.1 Concurrent Systems
A concurrent system in our framework is made up of several components, which
are automata provided with input and output ports for inter-component com-
munication. Each such port can either carry a message from a given set M of
messages or the special symbol ‘◦’ (no message). We useM◦ to denoteM∪{◦}.
We note that a port will always only carry at most one message. This is
w.l.o.g. since in every round a component can read all messages on its input
port, and hence, after one round, messages on input ports can be removed.
Also, a component only needs to write one message on the output port since
this message can be read by only one component, and hence, instead of writing
several messages on one output port in one round, the sending automaton can
simply concatenate all messages it wishes to send on the port. In other words,
it can simply send one long message.
We start by defining components of concurrent systems.
Definition 1 (component of concurrent system). A component of a con-
current system over a set M of messages is a tuple
A = (S, In,Out, I,∆) (5)
where
– S is a (possibly infinite) set of states,
– In is the set of input ports,
– Out is the set of output ports disjoint with In,
– I ⊆ S is the set of initial states, and
– ∆ ⊆ MIn◦ × S × S ×MOut◦ is the transition relation such that for every
(m, s) ∈MIn◦ × S there exist s′ and m′ with (m, s, s′,m′) ∈ ∆.
A transition (m, s, s′,m′) is meant to model that if A is in state s and reads
the messages m on its input ports, then it writes m′ on its output ports and
goes into state s′. In other words, a transition describes a possible I/O step of a
component.
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Note that by definition a component is required to be complete, i.e., it can
take a transition for every input it gets and every state it is in. This is a con-
venient requirement, which comes at no loss of generality, because every non-
complete component could be made complete by adding a dummy state and
appropriate transitions.
Several components can be composed to a concurrent system:
Definition 2 (concurrent system). A concurrent system over a set M of
messages is a finite family {Ai}i∈P of components over M of the form (Si, Ini,
Outi, Ii, ∆i) such that for every i,
– Ini ∩ Inj = ∅ for i 6= j, and
– Outi ∩Outj = ∅ for i 6= j.
Hence, we require that different components have disjoint sets of input and
output ports, respectively. It follows that every port p belonging to one set Ini
of input ports can belong to at most one set Outj of output ports. This will
allow component Aj to send messages to component Ai over the port p.
Given a concurrent system G = {Ai}i∈P as above, its set of input and output













I = {s ∈ S | s(i) ∈ Ii for i ∈ P} . (8)
A concurrent transition is a tuple of the form (m, s, s′,m′) satisfying (m|Ini , s(i),
s′(i),m′|Outi) ∈ ∆i for every i ∈ P . A global state of G is a pair (m, s) with
m ∈MP◦ and s ∈ S.
An infinite (m, s)-computation of G is an infinite sequence ρ = m0s0m1s1 . . .
of global states such that (m0, s0) = (m, s) and for every i,
– (mi, si, si+1,mi+1) is a concurrent transition and
– mi(p) = ◦ for every p ∈ P \Out.
Finite (m, s)-computations are defined in the same way.
An infinite sequence ρ = m0s0 . . . is called a computation if it is an (m, s)-
computation for some (m, s).
If m is such that m(p) = ◦ for every p ∈ P and if s ∈ I , we call an infinite
(m, s)-computation a run of G, i.e., a run is a computation where the ports
initially do not carry a message and the components are in one of their initial
states. A finite prefix of a run is called a run segment.
A global state (m, s) is called reachable if there is a run segment ρ =
m0s0m1s1 . . .mk−1sk−1 such that (mk−1, sk−1) = (m, s). Let (m, s) and (m′, s′)
be global states. We call (m′, s′) a descendant of (m, s) if there is an (m, s)-
computation ρ = m0s0m1s1 . . . such that (m
′, s′) = (mi, si) for some i ≥ 0, in
particular, (m, s) is a descendent of (m, s).
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4.2 Dolev-Yao Systems
In our framework, a cryptographic system is a concurrent system where the com-
ponents play certain roles and are connected in a certain fashion. In every such
system, there is one special component which models the Dolev-Yao intruder and
subsumes all executions of protocols by (completely) dishonest principals, and
there are other components modeling executions of protocols by honest (or semi-
honest) principals. More precisely, every such component models one instance of
a protocol run by one honest principal (honest instance).
The components are connected by ports as follows: Every component mod-
eling an honest instance has network and secure channel ports to all other in-
stances (some of these ports might not be used by that instance). The network
ports model network communication. Since, as usual, the Dolev-Yao intruder is
assumed to have full control over the network, he is connected to the network
ports of the honest instances. Conversely, honest instances are directly connected
via secure channel ports. In particular, messages sent over these ports are not
redirected through the adversary. However, if an honest instance is connect via
secure channel ports with a dishonest principal, then this means that the Dolev-
Yao intruder connects to these ports as dishonest principals are simulated by the
Dolev-Yao intruder. Instead of connecting two honest principals directly through
a secure channel, one could plug between two honest principals a secure chan-
nel component for more flexible scheduling. However, for simplicity and since
this does not change our results (if secure channel components between honest
principals are not controlled by the adversary), we choose direct secure channel
links.
To define cryptographic systems formally, let ALL be a set of principals,
partitioned in a set HON of honest principals and a set DIS = ALL \ HON of
dishonest principals. These sets determine the set P of the following ports where
π, π′ ∈ ALL with {π, π′} ∩ HON 6= ∅:
– netinππ′ , used by instance π to write a message into the network which is
intended for π′,
– netoutππ′ , used by π
′ to read messages from the network presumably from π,
– secππ′ , used by π as an output port to send a message over the secure channel
to π′ by π′ as an input port to receive a message from π over the secure
channel.
As explained above, netinππ′ will be an input port for the Dolev-Yao intruder,
netoutπ
′
π will be an output port of the Dolev-Yao intruder, and sec
π
π′ directly
connects the instances π and π′, in particular, it is not directed through the
Dolev-Yao intruder.
Note that in the above definition we require {π, π′}∩HON 6= ∅ since dishonest
instances are simulated by the Dolev-Yao intruder, and hence, no ports are
needed between dishonest instances.
We now define the intruder component, modeling the Dolev-Yao intruder.
The definition of this component depends on the following parameters: the sig-
nature Σ, the set of operations S ⊆ T (Σ,V) the intruder is able to perform,
the semantics of the operations given by an equational theory H, the finite set
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K ⊆M = T (Σ) (the intial intruder knowledge), and the set P partitioned into
honest and dishonest principals.
For ease in description, Σ, S, and H will henceforth be understood to be
present without being mentioned explicitly. Also, when we say that ALL is a
partitioned set of principals we assume that a set HON has been fixed and that
DIS = ALL \HON.
Definition 3 (intruder component). Let K ⊆ M be a set of messages and
ALL a partitoned set of principals. The intruder component AI for K and ALL
is the tuple
AI = (SI , InI ,OutI , {K}, ∆I) (9)
where the sets of the input and output ports are defined by
InI = {netinππ′ | π ∈ HON, π′ ∈ ALL} ∪ {secππ′ | π ∈ HON, π′ ∈ DIS} (10)
OutI = {netoutππ′ | π′ ∈ HON, π ∈ ALL} ∪ {secππ′ | π ∈ DIS, π′ ∈ HON} (11)
and
– SI is the set of all finite subsets of M, and
– ∆I is defined by (m, s, s′,m′) ∈ ∆I iff
• s′ = s ∪ {m(p) | m(p) 6= ◦, p ∈ InI} and
• m′(p) ∈ dS(s′) for all p ∈ OutI with m′(p) 6= ◦.
Given a partitioned set ALL of principals, an honest instance component for
π ∈ HON is a component with ports specified by
In = {netoutπ′π | π′ ∈ ALL} ∪ {secπ
′
π | π′ ∈ ALL} , (12)
Out = {netinππ′ | π′ ∈ ALL} ∪ {secππ′ | π′ ∈ ALL} . (13)
Now we can define our notion of cryptographic system, also called a Dolev-
Yao system:
Definition 4 (Dolev-Yao system). Let K ⊆ M, ALL a partitioned set of
principals with HON, and {Aπ}π∈HON a family of honest instance components.
The Dolev-Yao system determined by this is the concurrent system
{Aπ}π∈HON∪{I} (14)
where AI is the intruder component for K and ALL. We refer to such a Dolev-
Yao system by DY[{Aπ}π∈HON,HON, DIS,K]; the set S of operations the in-
truder may use to derive new messages is understood from the context.
We define K(m, s) = s(I) ∪ {m(p) | m(p) 6= ◦, p ∈ InI} to be the knowledge
of the intruder at state (m, s). We say that the intruder can deduce message m′
at state (m, s) if m′ ∈ dS(K(m, s)).
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4.3 Modeling the ASW Protocol
It is almost straightforward to turn the informal description of the ASW protocol
into our framework. We demonstrate this by modeling an instance of Alice and
describe how we model the TTP for the ASW protocol in detail.
To describe instance automata of honest participants we use two possible
ways: pseudocode and transition table.
Our pseudocode is a list of items of the following form
<condition>
<action-list>
The condition <condition> is a condition about the internal state of a partic-
ipant together with conditions about messages pending on input ports for this
participant. For example in
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
(π1(π1(netout
B





A), pk(B)) 6= ok):
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
– stateA = (i, abort-req-sent)
m2 = 〈aborted,me1〉
ma1 = 〈m2, sig(sk(A),m2)〉
secAT = ma1
the condition checks if the local state of participant A is (i, pos-sent) (indi-
cating that Alice has sent her promise of signature to Bob) and the message
pending on channel netoutBA is not me1, i.e., is not of the form of a promise
of signature from Bob. According to the protocol Alice has two possibilities in
this situation i) waiting for the promise of signature from Bob to come and ii)
sending an abort request to the TTP. Waiting for Bob’s promise of signature is
modelled by staying in state (i, pos-sent) and sending an abort request to the
TTP is divided in simpler steps, i.e.,
– stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) : change local state to (i, abort-req-sent)
m2 = 〈aborted,me1〉 : construct abort request ma1
ma1 = 〈m2, sig(sk(A),m2)〉
secAT = ma1 : send ma1 over secure channel sec
A
T
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is that the list is gone through in a top down manner and for the first condition
<condition-i> that is satisfied one action of the action list <action-list-i>
is chosen nondeterministically to be performed. If no condition is satisfied, the
state of the automaton does not change. It is straightforward to construct an
instance automata from such a pseudocode description.
A simple and compact way to describe the behaviour of the TTP is by giving
a kind of transition table, see Figure 2. According to the protocol the TTP
maintains a database for the protocol instances for which she were invoked by
one of the principals, i.e., one of the participants sent a request to her. The
key for the database is a tuple the form 〈text, pk(X), pk(Y )〉 where this tuple
stands for the protocol instance where X is the initiator, Y is the responder,
and text is the contractual text of the contract in consideration. For an instance
of the protocol in which the TTP is involved she stores two things i) a status
information for this instance and ii) a message that is needed for responding to
later requests. The status information is needed to distinguish between the cases
that the TTP has resolved a contract signing procedure by issuing a contract or
has aborted a contract signing procedure.
The table is partitioned into two parts. The left part (first three columns)
describes the conditions that must be true for the TTP to perform the actions
described by the right part of the table.
If the TTP has not yet received a request for instance 〈text, pk(X), pk(Y )〉,
then the database has no entry for this instance, i.e., there is no status informa-
tion for this instance in the database (indicated by ⊥).
The columns ‘from A’ and ‘from B’ specify the kind of request the TTP is
expecting from A or B. Now we explain the abbreviations used in the table in
more detail.
The first two letters of these abbreviations indicate which participant is in
the initiator role and which participant is in the responder role. An abbreviation
that starts with AB stands for an instance where A is in the initiator and B is
in the responder role. The abbreviations in detail are:
ABabort abort request message sent by A
ABabort-ack abort acknowledge message sent by the TTP
ABresA resolve request message sent by A
ABresB resolve request message sent by B
ABrepl-contract replacement contract signed by the TTP
Now, the first row of the table is read as: If on channel secAT message ABabort
is pending, on channel secBT no request for the corresponding instance is received,
and the status for this instance is ⊥, then the new status for this instance
is aborted, message ABabort-ack is sent to A on channel secTA and the abort
acknowledge message ABabort-ack is stored for this instance. In the table we see
(fourth row) that in this specification of the TTP resolve requests take priority
over abort request when both types of request are pending. The value that is
stored in the database is used to respond to later requests. For example, in the
8th row, describing the situation that the status for instance 〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉
is aborted and the TTP receives a resolve request from B. In this situation the
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stored value in the database for this instance is ABabort-ack and this stored value
is sent to B as a response to his resolve request.
The TTP must handle requests for various instances. These instances are
described by the same table with the names of the participants modified accord-
ingly. In case the TTP receives requests at the same time for different instances,
she simply looks up the appropriate action in the corresponding tables.
5 Balanced and Abuse-free Protocols
In this section, we present our formal definition of abuse-freeness, based on the
notion of balance, which, in turn, is based on the notion of strategy.
To pave the way for our formal definitions, we start with informal descriptions
of balance and abuse-freeness and some comments.
Balance (informal definition): A contract signing protocol is unbalanced for
participant A if at some point during the execution of the protocol (another)
participant B has both (i) a strategy to prevent A from getting a valid
contract and (ii) a strategy to obtain a valid contract.
As explained in the introduction, abuse-freeness will be formulated based on
off-line attacks. The informal definition is the following:
Abuse-freeness (informal definition): A contract signing protocol is not abuse-
free for a participant A if at some point during the execution of the protocol
another participant B can convince an outside party C that he is or was in
a state unbalanced for A and that he could (still) be in such a state.
The following subsections formalize this in detail.
5.1 Strategies
Strategies in the context of abuse-freeness need to be defined with respect to
partial information, since participant B will not necessarily know the global
state of the entire protocol at any point of protocol execution. We formalize this
using the notion of view functions.
Definition 5 (view function). Let G be a concurrent system with set of ports
P and state set S. A function with domain (MP◦ ×S)+ is called a view function
for G.
When view is a view function and ρ a run segment, we say that view(ρ) is
the view of ρ w. r. t. view.
Strategies in our context are—as mentioned above—based on partial infor-
mation. In addition, they are carried out by a coalition of components of a given
concurrent system.
Assume {Ai}i∈P is a concurrent system as above. Any subset of P is called
a coalition. Given a coalition J , we write OutJ for
⋃
j∈J Outj .
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Definition 6 (strategy). Let G = {Ai}i∈P be a concurrent system. Assume
J ⊆ P is a coalition of G and view : (MP◦ × S)+ →W is a view function for G.
A function




is a view-strategy for J if it satisfies the following condition for every non-empty
run segment ρ = m0s0 . . .mlsl of G: if σ(view(ρ)) = (m, s), then for every j ∈ J
(ml|Inj , sl(j), s(j),m|Outj ) ∈ ∆j , (16)
Let (m, s) ∈MP◦ ×SG be a global state of G. The outcome of G w. r. t. σ is the set
denoted out((m, s), σ) and defined to consist of all infinite (m, s)-computations
m0s0m1s1 . . . satisfying
σ(view(m0s0 . . .mlsl)) = (ml+1|OutJ , sl+1|J) (17)
for every l ≥ 0.
5.2 Balanced Protocols
In our formal definition of balance, participant B is modelled by a coalition and
the two goals B wants to achieve (e.g., prevent A from getting a valid contract
or obtain a valid contract) is defined as a path property, that is, by two sets of
runs.
We start with a definition of path properties, adjusted to our context.
Definition 7 (property). Let G be a concurrent system with set of ports P
and state set S. A set ϕ ⊆ (MP◦ × S)ω is called a G-property.
A situation in which we are interested in balance is always determined by a
tuple (I, view, ϕ1, ϕ2) consisting of a coaltion I , a view function view and path
properties ϕ1 and ϕ2. That is why we refer to such a tuple as a balance specifier,
usually denoted by β.
Definition 8 (balance). Let G be a concurrent system with index set P , (m, s)
a reachable state of G, and β = (I, view, ϕ1, ϕ2) a balance specifier.
The state (m, s) is β-unbalanced if there are view-strategies σ1 and σ2 for I
such that:
1. ρ ∈ ϕ1 for every ρ ∈ out((m, s), σ1), and
2. ρ ∈ ϕ2 for every ρ ∈ out((m, s), σ2).
The system G is β-unbalanced if there is a reachable state (m, s) of G that is
β-unbalanced.
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5.3 Tests
In our formalization of abuse-freeness, we use a specific but natural notion of
tests that C can make use of to verify that B is in fact in the position he claims
to be in. This notion of test is defined first, before we discuss abuse-freeness.
With regard to the expressiveness of tests, we note the following. Suppose
a contract signing protocol is abuse-free with respect to a weak notion of test.
Then it is also abuse-free with respect to a stronger notion of test, because C
has at least as much power as before to verify the evidence presented to him
by B. On the contrary, suppose a protocol is not abuse-free with respect to a
strong notion of test. Then it is neither abuse-free for a weaker notion of test.
This means it is important to have different notions of test with various degrees
of expressiveness.
Definition 9 (atomic test). Let X ⊆ T (Σ) ↓. A pair (M,M ′) of simple
(S ∪ X )-terms is called an atomic X -test or simply test if X is clear from the
context. A message m ∈M passes the test (M,M ′), denoted m |=H (M,M ′), if
M [m/x] ≡H M ′[m/x]. The message m fails the test (M,M ′) if m does not pass
it.
An ordinary test is a boolean combination of atomic tests:
Definition 10 (boolean test). A boolean test is a boolean combination of
atomic tests. A message m passes a boolean test θ, denoted m |=H θ, if θ eval-
uates to true when each atomic test is replaced by true if m passes this test and
by false otherwise.
The strongest notion of test is the following.
Definition 11 (ω-test). An ω-test is a boolean combination with possibly in-
finite disjunctions and conjunctions. A message m passes an ω-test θ, denoted
m |=H θ, if θ evaluates to true when each atomic test is replaced by true if m
passes this test and by false otherwise.
In the following, when we speak of a test, we mean a test of any of the
three types. For a given test θ, a state (m, s) of a Dolev-Yao system G is called
θ-possible if there exists a message m′ ∈ dS(K(m, s)) such that m′ |= θ.
Clearly, ω-tests are strictly stronger than boolean test, which, in turn, are
strictly stronger than atomic tests. Consider, for instance, the case where Σ =
{c, f, g} with constant symbol c and unary function symbols f and g, S =
{c, f(x), g(x)} and H = ∅. Then it is easy to see that there is an ω-test which
defines exactly the set of messages of the form f(f(f(. . . f(c) . . . ))), which cannot
be achieved by boolean tests. Similarly, the set {c, f(c)} can be defined by a
boolean test, but not by an atomic one.
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5.4 Abuse-free protocols
As already explained earlier, when a protocol is considered abuse-free, then this
means that from Charlie’s point of view Bob has no way of convincing him
that he is in an unbalanced state. That is, the property of being abuse-free is
relative to the view that Charlie has of the protocol. Technically, such a view is
determined by a Dolev-Yao system and a balance specifier. This motivates the
following definition. A pair (Ge, βe) consisting of a Dolev-Yao system Ge and a
balance specifier βe is called an external view (with respect to abuse-freeness).
The next definition puts everything together. A protocol is not abuse-free if
there is a test which indicates unbalanced states as explained before:
Definition 12 (abuse-freeness). Let X ⊆ M. An external view (Ge, βe) is
X -abusive if there exists an X -test θ such that the following two conditions are
satisfied:
1. There exists a θ-possible and β-unbalanced state in Ge.
2. Each θ-possible state (m, s) of Ge is a descendant of a θ-possible and β-
unbalanced state in Ge.
Such a test is called (Ge, βe)-convincing. The external view (Ge, βe) is called
X -abuse-free if Ge it is not X -abusive.
6 ASW Protocol Analyzed
In this section, we analyse the ASW contract signing protocol in our concur-
rent setting. We show that it is unbalanced (in contrast to what is known from
settings where concurrency is modeled by interleaving and the honest party is
not optimistic) and not abuse-free. Moreover, we demonstrate that the security
properties of the ASW protocol are sensitive to how the TTP handles messages
that are received at the same time, a phenomenon that has not been observed
previously. But note that independently of how the TTP is modeled no version
turns out to be secure (abuse-free).
For our formal analysis of the ASW protocol, we will use the model developed
in Section 4, see Examples 1, 2, and 3. That is, we assume Σ = ΣASW, S = SASW,
and H = HASW.
6.1 ASW Protocol is not Balanced
First, recall that the ASW protocol is balanced when an interleaving model is
adopted and the honest party is not optimistic (can be shown, for instance, like
the results shown in [5] for the GJM protocol). Basically, the reason is that Alice
can contact the TTP to abort the contract signing if Bob does not respond to the
first message of Alice in the exchange protocol, and because of the interleaving
assumption, Bob cannot make sure a resolve request from his part is handled by
the TTP before Alice’s abort request is.
By contrast, if we consider a concurrent setting and make the assumptions
that (1) the message Bob (the intruder) sends arrive at least as fast as those of
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Alice, and (2) the TTP handles a resolve request first when an abort request is
pending at the same time, then we can argue (informally) that the protocol is
unbalanced: Bob has (i) a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a valid contract,
namely by simply doing nothing, and (ii) a strategy to resolve the contract
signing after Alice has sent the first message of the exchange protocol, namely
by sending a resolve request to the TTP. Even if Alice sends an abort request to
the TTP at the same time, because of assumption (1) her request cannot reach
the TTP before Bob’s resolve request and with assumption (2) we know that
Bobs resolve request takes priority over Alice’s abort request if the two request
arrive at the same time.
We analyse the situation in which (i) there is one protocol instance for each
Alice (the initiator), Bob (the responder), and the TTP, (ii) Alice and the TTP
are specified by the pseudo code given in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, and (iii)
Bob is considered to be dishonest and modeled by the intruder. That is, we let
ALL = {A,B, T}, HON = {A, T}, K = {A,B, T, sk(B), text, initiator, responder,
pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), ok}, and GASW = {Ai}i∈P with P = {I, A, T} be the Dolev-
Yao system induced.
Next, let I = {I}. To formally define balance, we use tests to check whether
a message has the form of a valid contract for Bob in the role of the responder
and of a valid contract for Bob in the role of the initiator:
θcontract = θcontractinitiator ∨ θcontractresponder . (18)
We will define θcontractinitiator in more detail; the other test is analogous. The test θ
contract
initiator
has to test if a message has the form of a standard contract or the form of a
replacement contract. Thus, θcontractinitiator is of the form
θcontractinitiator = θ
contract
i,standard ∨ θcontracti,replacement . (19)
The test θcontracti,standard is defined by
θcontracti,standard =(sigcheck(〈pk(B), pk(A), pk(T ), text, hash(π2(x))〉, π1(x), pk(B)), ok) ∧
(sigcheck(〈π1(x), hash(π222(x))〉, π221(x) , pk(A)), ok) .
The other parts of the test θcontract can be defined in a similar way. Using these
tests, we can define in a straightforward manner the path property ϕI to describe
that the intruder does get a valid contract.
ϕI = {m0s0 · · · ∈ (MP◦ × S)ω | ∃i∃m(m ∈ dS(K(mi, si)) ∧m |= θcontract)} .
The path property ϕ̄A describes that Alice does not get a valid contract and is
defined by
ϕ̄A = {m0s0 · · · ∈ (MP◦ × S)ω | ∀i(stateA(si) /∈ {(i, contract), (i, resolved)})}
where stateA(si) denotes the value of the variable stateA in state si (see Figure 1).
We now define the balance specifier βASW = ({I}, viewI , ϕ̄A, ϕI) that de-
scribe being unbalanced for Alice.
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We also assume that Bob’s view of the system is limited to his own his-
tory, that is, we use the view function viewI defined by viewI(m0s0 . . .mlsl) =
m0|InI∪OutIs0(I) . . .ml|InI∪OutIsl(I).
The following proposition states that the state of GASW after Alice sent her
first message of the exchange protocol is βASW-unbalanced. The proof of this
proposition corresponds exactly to the informal argumentation above that de-
scribes why the ASW protocol is unbalanced for Alice.
Lemma 2. Let m0s0 . . .mksk be a run segment of GASW and assume, for all
i < k, that mi(netin
A
B) = ◦ as well as mk(netinAB) 6= ◦. Then (mk, sk) is βASW-
unbalanced.
The above condition is satisfied in a run if Alice just sent her first message.
Obviously, there are runs in which such a state exist. Thus, there is a reachable
state of GASW that is βASW-unbalanced which shows the following theorem
Theorem 1 (ASW is initiator unbalanced). The Dolev-Yao system GASW
is βASW-unbalanced.
Note that the initial state of GASW is not βASW-unbalanced because the in-
truder cannot force Alice to participate in the protocol.
Our proofs crucially relies on the fact that the TTP serves a resolve request
before an abort request when both are pending at the same time. However,
we can also show that if the TTP reverses its resolution strategy with respect
to competing requests, that is, if she first serves an abort request and then a
resolve request, then the protocol is unbalanced for the responder: Once the
(honest) responder sent his first message, the (dishonest) initiator can send an
abort to the TTP. Even if the responder sends a resolve right after he sent his
first message, the two messages (abort from the initiator and resolve from the
responder) would reach the TTP at the same time, and hence, the TTP would
abort. Conversely, the initiator, once he got the first message from the responder,
has obviously a strategy to obtain a valid contract.
More precisely, for a corresponding Dolev-Yao system G ′ASW and appropriate




Theorem 2 (ASW is responder unbalanced). The Dolev-Yao system G ′ASW
is β′ASW-unbalanced.
Even if the TTP resolved competing requests randomly, the protocol would
be unbalanced to a serious extent, because Alice and Bob would have strategies
that would be successful with high probability (1/2).
6.2 ASW Protocol is not Abuse-free
For abuse-freeness, we imagine that Charlie assumes that there is only one in-
stance of the ASW protocol running, but that he does not know whether Alice is
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the initiator or responder, which is a realistic assumption. Formally, we replace
AA by a variant of it, denoted AA′ , which in the beginning decides whether
it wants to play the role of the initiator or the responder and then sends a
corresponding message to Bob, see pseudocode description in Figures 3 and 4.
We set GeASW = DY[{Ai}i∈{A′,T}, {A′, T}, {B},K] with K as above, βeASW =
({Ie}, viewIe , ϕ̄A, ϕIe), and X = {A,B,C, T, pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), pk(C), sk(C),
text, ok}. Here, Ie denotes the intruder of GeASW. We also consider the situa-
tion where T is replaced by T ′ which gives priority to abort over resolve. The
corresponding external view is denoted by (G ′eASW, β
′e
ASW). We prove:
Theorem 3 (ASW not abuse-free). The external views (GeASW, βeASW) and
(G′eASW, β
′e
ASW) are X -abusive.
In order to prove this theorem we need the following lemma; the proof of this
lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 3. Let K ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be a set of ground terms such that sk(A) /∈ dSASW (K∪
C). Then for all m ∈ dSASW(K ∪ C) where m ↓= sig(sk(A),m′) we have that
m↓∈ Sub(K↓).
Now we can give the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof: We first show that the external view (GeASW, βeASW) are X -abusive. Ac-
cording to Definition 12 we have to show that there is a (GeASW, βeASW)-convincing
X -test θ and a reachable state (m, s) of GeASW such that the intruder can deduce
a message m′ in (m, s) that passes θ.
Define θ by θ = θ1 ∧ θ2, where
θ1 = (π1(π1(x)), pk(A)) ∧ (π1(π2(π1(x))), pk(B))∧
(π1(π2(π2(π1(x)))), pk(T )) ∧ (π1(π2(π2(π2(π1(x))))), text)
and θ2 = (sigcheck(π1(x), π2(x), pk(A)), ok). By θ1 Charlie is testing if Alice is
in the initiator role and by θ2 he is testing if Alice has already sent the first
message of the exchange protocol.
We first have to show that θ is a (GeASW, βeASW)-convincing X -test. It is
easy to see that a message m′ ∈ T (Σ) ↓ that passes θ is of the form m′ =
〈m′′, sig(sk(A),m′′)〉, where m′′ has the form m′′ = 〈pk(A), 〈pk(B), 〈pk(T ), 〈text,
m′′′〉〉〉〉.
Since m′ contains a signature from Alice and KI↓ does not contain sk(A) as
a subterm we can conclude using Lemma 3 that Alice must have sent her first
message of the exchange protocol.
Since m′ passes θ2 we know that Alice must be in the initiator role. So using
Proposition 2 we know that a θ-possible state (m, s) of GeASW is βeASW-unbalanced
or a descendant of an βeASW-unbalanced state of GeASW.
Now we have to show that there is a reachable state (m, s) in GeASW such
that the intruder can deduce a message in (m, s) that passes θ. The first mes-
sage Alice sends in the exchange protocol to the intruder is of the form m′ =
〈m′′, sig(sk(A),m′′), where m′′ has the form m′′ = 〈pk(A), 〈pk(B), 〈pk(T ), 〈text,
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m′′′〉〉〉〉. Since m′ obviously passes θ the intruder is able to deduce a message
that passes θ after Alice has sent her first message to the intruder.
So (GeASW, βeASW) is X -abusive.
Note that if Charlie would have performed θ2 on the message shown by the
intruder only, he would not be convinced that Alice is in the initiator role, so θ2
is not a (GeASW, βeASW)-convincing X -test.
The proof of the fact that the external view (G ′eASW, β
′e
ASW) is X -abusive is
similar to the proof that (G ′eASW, β
′e
ASW) is X -abusive. The main difference is that
we have to provide a test that checks whether a message has the form of the first
message sent by the responder, i.e., his promise of signature instead of the test
given above. 2
7 GJM Protocol Analyzed
In this section we will analyse the GJM contract signing protocol. We will show
that this protocol run in a concurrent setting is unbalanced but abuse-free.
The signature that we consider is
ΣGJM = {sig(·, ·, ·), sigcheck(·, ·, ·), pk(·), sk(·), 〈·, ·〉, π1(·), π2(·),
fake(·, ·, ·, ·, ·), pcs(·, ·, ·, ·, ·), pcsver(·, ·, ·, ·, ·),
sconvert(·, ·, ·), tpconvert(·, ·, ·), sver(·, ·, ·, ·), tpver(·, ·, ·, ·),
A,B, T, text, ok, pcsok, sok, tpok, initiator, responder, aborted} ∪ C ∪ R
where R is a set of constants that represent the random coins used by different
participants in their computations. The set R is the disjoint union of RA, RTTP ,
RB , and RI where RA repreent the randomn coins used by Alice, RB are those
for Bob, RTTP the ones for the TTP, and RI are the randomn coins for the
intruder. Let KI = K ∪ C ∪ RI .
A term of the form pcs(u, sk(x), w, pk(y), pk(z)) stands for a PCS computed
by x (with sk(x)) involving the text w, the party y, and the TTP z while u
models the random coins used to compute the PCS. Everbody can verify the PCS
with the public keys involved (identity (23)), but cannot determine whether the
PCS was computed by x or y (identity (24)): instead of x computing the “real”
PCS, y could have computed a “fake” PCS which would also pass the verification
with pcsver. Using sconvert and tpconvert, see (25) and (26), a “real” PCS can be
converted by x and the TTP z, respectively, into a universally verifiable signature
(verifiable by everone who possess pk(x) and pk(z)). We model the third party-
accountable version here: One can tell whether x or the TTP converted the PCS.
(We can easily also model the TTP-invisible version. However, it does not effect
our results.) The equational theory HGJM that models the above semantics along
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with some obvious rules for projection and signature verification is given below.
π1(〈x, y〉) = x, (20)
π2(〈x, y〉) = y, (21)
sigcheck(x, sig(u, sk(y), x), pk(y)) = ok, (22)
pcsver(w, pk(x), pk(y), pk(z), pcs(u, sk(x), w, pk(y), pk(z))) = pcsok,(23)
pcsver(w, pk(x), pk(y), pk(z), fake(u, sk(y), w, pk(x), pk(z))) = pcsok,(24)
sver(w, pk(x), pk(z), sconvert(u, sk(x), pcs(v, sk(x), w, pk(y), pk(z)))) = sok, (25)
tpver(w, pk(x), pk(z), tpconvert(u, sk(z), pcs(v, sk(x), w, pk(y), pk(z)))) = tpok. (26)
The set SGJM of operations available is defined by
SGJM = {〈x1, x2〉, π1(x1), π2(x1),
sig(x1, x2, x3), pcs(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5), fake(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5),
sconvert(x1, x2, x3), tpconvert(x1, x2, x3),
sigcheck(x1, x2, x3),
sver(x1, x2, x3, x4), tpver(x1, x2, x3, x4), pcsver(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5)}
We set Σ = ΣGJM, S = SGJM, and H = HGJM.
7.1 GJM Protocol is not Balanced
We analyse the following situation. We have one protocol instance of Alice, Bob
and the TTP, where Alice and the TTP are specified by the pseudo code given
in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. Bob is considered to be dishonest and will be
modeled by the intruder.
We will now describe the formal setting in which we analyse the GJM pro-
tocol and state that in this setting the GJM protocol is unbalanced for Al-
ice. That is, we let ALL = {A,B, T}, HON = {A, T}, DIS = {B}, K =
{A,B, T, sk(B), text, initiator, responder, pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), ok}, and GGJM =
DY[{Ai}i∈HON,HON,DIS,K] be the Dolev-Yao system induced. As mentioned,
the components for A and T are depicted in Figure 5 and 6. Note that T gives
priority to resolve if received at the same time as an abort. Let I denote the
component corresponding to B in GGJM.
Let I = {I}. To formally define balance, we use tests to check whether a
message has the form of a valid contract for Bob in the role of the responder
and of a valid contract for Bob in the role of the initiator:
θcontract = θcontractinitiator ∨ θcontractresponder . (27)
The tests θcontractinitiator and θ
contract
responder can be defined in the same way as for the ASW-
protocol, see Section 6. Using these tests, we can define in a straightforward
manner the path property ϕI to describe that the intruder does get a valid
contract.
ϕI = {m0s0 · · · ∈ (MP◦ × S)ω | ∃i∃m(m ∈ dS(K(mi, si)) ∧m |= θcontract)} .
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The path property ϕ̄A describes that Alice does not get a valid contract and is
defined by
ϕ̄A = {m0s0 · · · ∈ (MP◦ × S)ω | ∀i(stateA(si) /∈ {(i, contract), (i, resolved)})}
where stateA(si) denotes the value of the variable stateA in state si (see Figure 5).
Bob’s view of the system is limited to his own history, that is, we use the
view function viewI defined by
viewI(m0s0 . . .mlsl) = m0|InI∪OutIs0(I) . . . ml|InI∪OutIsl(I).
We now define the balance specifier βGJM to be ({I}, viewI , ϕ̄A, ϕI).
Lemma 4 characterizes the states of GGJM that are βGJM-unbalanced. Intu-
itively, the lemma states that the state of GGJM after Alice has sent her promise
of signature to the intruder is βGJM-unbalanced.
Before we state this and other lemmas, we introduce abbreviations for mes-
sages of the GJM-protocol to increase readability.
First, we consider messages of the protocol instance where Alice is in the
initiator role. The first message Alice sends as initiator in the exchange protocol
is abbreviated by ABposAr, i.e., ABposAr = pcs(r, sk(A), 〈c, 1〉, pk(B), pk(T )) for
some randomness r ∈ T (Σ)↓. In the following abbreviations of messages sub-
scripts allways denote randomnesses and these subscripts are read as ‘for some
randomness terms from T (Σ)↓’. The promise of signature from Bob in this in-
stance is written as ABposBr, i.e., ABposBr = pcs(r, sk(B), 〈c, 2〉, pk(A), pk(T )).
The abort request message from Alice is abbreviated by ABabortr, i.e.,
ABabortr = sig(r, sk(A), 〈c, pk(A), pk(B), abort〉). The abort acknowledge mes-
sage of the TTP is abbreviated by ABabort-ackr,r′ , i.e.,
ABabort-ackr,r′ = sig(r, sk(T ), sig(r
′, sk(A), 〈c, pk(A), pk(B), abort〉)).
The resolve request message of Alice and Bob are abbreviated by ABresAr,r′,r′′
and ABresBr,r′,r′′ , respectively, i.e.,
ABresAr,r′,r′′=〈sconvert(r, sk(A), pcs(r′, sk(A), 〈c, 1〉, pk(B), pk(T ))),ABposBr′′〉
and
ABresBr,r′,r′′=〈ABposAr, sconvert(r′, sk(B), pcs(r′′, sk(B), 〈c, 2〉, pk(A), pk(T )))〉.
The messages of the protocol instance where Alice is in the responder role are
defined symmetrically. The first message Bob sends as initiator in the exchange
protocol is abbreviated by BAposBr, i.e.,
BAposBr = pcs(r, sk(B), 〈c, 1〉, pk(A), pk(T )).
The promise of signature from Alice is written as BAposAr, i.e.,
BAposAr = pcs(r, sk(A), 〈c, 2〉, pk(B), pk(T )).
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The abort request message from Bob is abbreviated by BAabortr, i.e.,
BAabortr = sig(r, sk(B), 〈c, pk(B), pk(A), abort〉).
The abort acknowledge message of the TTP is abbreviated by BAabort-ackr,r′ ,
i.e.,
BAabort-ackr,r′ = sig(r, sk(T ), sig(r
′, sk(B), 〈c, pk(B), pk(A), abort〉)).
The resolve request message from Bob and Alice are abbreviated by BAresBr,r′,r′′
and BAresAr,r′,r′′ , respectively, i.e.,
BAresBr,r′,r′′ = 〈sconvert(r, sk(B), pcs(r′, sk(B), 〈c, 1〉, pk(A), pk(T ))),BAposAr′′〉
and
BAresAr,r′,r′′ = 〈BAposBr, sconvert(r′, sk(A), pcs(r′′, sk(A), 〈c, 2〉, pk(B), pk(T )))〉.
Lemma 4. Let (m, s) be a reachable state of GGJM. Then the following two
conditions are equivalent:
1) (m, s) is βGJM-unbalanced.
2) i) stateA(s) = (i, pos-sent),
ii) m(netoutBA) 6= ABposBr for all r ∈ T (Σ)↓, and
iii) there is a run segment m0s0 . . .mksk such that (mk, sk) = (m, s) and
for all i ≤ k and r ∈ T (Σ)↓ we have mi(secBT ) 6= ABresBr.
To prove Lemma 4 we need some technical lemmas. The proofs are very similar
to the proof of Lemma 12 and are therefore omitted. Intuitively, the following
lemma states that without knowing the secret key sk(A) of Alice one cannot
derive a signature from Alice on a message m unless the signature is present
already.
Lemma 5. Let K ⊆ T (Σ) ↓ be {sk(A)}-free. Let r,m ∈ T (Σ) ↓. Then, the
following conditions are equivalent:
1) sig(r, sk(A),m) 6∈ dS(K).
2) For all M ∈ K and p ∈ Pos(M) such that M |p = sig(r, sk(A),m) there is a
proper prefix p′ of p such that root(M |p′) 6= 〈,〉.
Lemma 6 states that without knowing the secret key sk(A) of Alice one cannot
convert a pcs-signature from Alice on a message m to a universally verifiable
signature on m unless this converted signature is present already.
Lemma 6. Let K ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {sk(A)}-free. Let r, r′,m ∈ T (Σ)↓. Then, the
following conditions are equivalent:
1) sconvert(r, sk(A), pcs(r′, sk(A),m, pk(B), pk(T ))) 6∈ dS(K).
2) For all M ∈ K and p ∈ Pos(M) such that
M |p = sconvert(r, sk(A), pcs(r′, sk(A),m, pk(B), pk(T )))
there is a proper prefix p′ of p such that root(M |p′) 6= 〈,〉.
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Lemma 7 is the corresponding lemma to 6 for the conversion of a pcs-signed
message by the TTP . That is, without knowing the secret key sk(T ) of the TTP
one cannot convert a pcs-signature from Alice (where T is the corresponding
TTP) on a message m to a universally verifiable signature on m unless this
converted signature is present already.
Lemma 7. Let K ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {sk(T )}-free. Let r, r′,m ∈ T (Σ)↓. Then, the
following conditions are equivalent:
1) tpconvert(r, sk(T ), pcs(r′, sk(A),m, pk(B), pk(T ))) 6∈ dS(K).
2) For all M ∈ K and p ∈ Pos(M) such that
M |p = tpconvert(r, sk(T ), pcs(r′, sk(A),m, pk(B), pk(T )))
there is a proper prefix p′ of p such that root(M |p′) 6= 〈,〉 and
Now we can prove Lemma 4.
Proof: In the protocol GGJM Bob is modelled by the intruder. Therefore, in the
following we write ‘Bob’ instead of ‘the intruder’.
1)⇒2): We prove this implication by contraposition. First we show that if
stateA(s) 6= (i, pos-sent), then (m, s) is βGJM-balanced. We distinguish between
the possible values of stateA(s):
– stateA(s) = 0: Obviously, Bob cannot force Alice to participate in the pro-
tocol. In particular, Alice can decide to stay in state stateA(s) = 0. In
such run Alice neither sends a promise of signature of the form ABposAr
(r ∈ T (Signature) ↓) nor a signature sconvert(r′, sk(A),ABposAr) (r, r′ ∈
T (Signature)↓) to Bob. By Lemma 5 and 6 we know that Bob neither can
derive Alices’ promise of signature nor her signature from his knowledge K.
Thus, he neither will get Alices’ signature nor he can use the TTP to re-
solve the contract signing. (Note that Bob needs Alices’ promise of signature
ABposAr for some r ∈ T (Σ)↓ to send a valid resolve request to the TTP.)
By Lemma 7 we know that Bob cannot derive a message of the form of a
contract issued by the TTP from K.
– stateA(s) = initiator: Similar argument as in the previous case since Alice
can decide not to send her promise of signature to Bob.
– stateA(s) = (i, sig-sent): Alice has the possibility to run the resolve subpro-
tocol with the TTP to resolve the contract signing procedure since she has a
promise of signature ABposBr (r ∈ T (Σ)↓) from Bob. The TTP will issue a
contract in response to Alices’ resolve request since the TTP has not received
an abort request for this instance of the protocol before: First, Alice has not
sent an abort request to the TTP. Second, Bob cannot derive a valid abort
request for this instance of the protocol because for this he would need to
derive a signature of Alice on the message 〈text, pk(A), pk(B), aborted〉 and
this is impossible, see Lemma 5. (Also, Bob cannot send a message on secAT .)
Thus, Bob does not have a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a contract.
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– stateA(s) = (i, abort-req-sent): Let m0s0 . . .mksk be a run segment of GGJM
that leads to (m, s), i.e., (mk, sk) = (m, s). Since we have stateA(s) =
(i, abort-req-sent), we know that Alice has sent an abort request to the TTP
in the last step, i.e., mk(sec
A
T ) = ABabortr for some r ∈ T (Σ)↓. We distin-
guish two cases:
i) if the intruder has not sent an resolve request to the TTP, i.e., mi(sec
B
T ) 6=
ABresBr for all i ≤ k and r ∈ T (Σ)↓, then he cannot get a contract anymore
(the argument is similar as in the case of stateA(s) = 0). So Bob does not
have a strategy to get a contract.
ii) if Bob has sent his resolve request to the TTP already, then Alice will get
a contract in response to her abort request issued by the TTP. So Bob does
not have a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a contract.
– stateA(s) = (i, aborted): Let m0s0 . . .mksk be a run segment of GGJM that
leads to (m, s), i.e., (mk, sk) = (m, s). Since the TTP has sent an abort
acknowledge message ABabort-ackr,r′ (r, r
′ ∈ T (Σ)↓) to Alice, Alice must
have sent an abort request ABabortr to the TTP before, i.e., there is i ≤
k − 2 such that mi(secAT ) = ABabortr, stateA(si+1) = (i, abort-req-sent),
mi+1(sec
T
A) = ABabort-ackr,r′ , and stateA(si+2) = (i, aborted). If for some
descendant (m′, s′) of (mi, si) we have that m′(secBT ) = ABresBu,v,w for
some u, v, w ∈ T (Σ)↓, then according to the definition of the TTP we have
m′′(secTB) = ABabort-ackr,r′ for the successor state (m
′′, s′′) of (m′, s′). As in
the case of stateA(s) = 0, we can conclude from the fact that Alice neither
has sent her signature sconvert(u, sk(A),ABposAv) (u, v ∈ T (Σ)↓) to Bob
nor can use the TTP to get a contract, that Bob will not get a contract
anymore. Hence, Bob does not have a strategy to get a contract.
– stateA(s) ∈ {(i, contract), (i, resolved)}: Alice has a contract so Bob does not
have a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a contract.
Now we show that if stateA(s) = (i, pos-sent) and condition ii) or condition iii)
does not hold we also have that (m, s) is βGJM-balanced. If condition ii) does not
hold we have that m(netoutBA) = ABposBr for some r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and according
to the protocol specification Alice will send her signature to Bob and in the
successor state (m′, s′) of (m, s) we will have that stateA(s′) = (i, sig-sent). In
(m′, s′) Alice could send her resolve request to the TTP and will get a contract
issued by the TTP back in response. Note that the intruder cannot send a
valid abort request for this instance of the protocol since he cannot derive a
message of the desired form (see case stateA(s) = (i, sig-sent)). Thus, Bob cannot
prevent Alice from getting a valid contract. If condition ii) holds but condition
iii) does not, then we know that for the run segment m0s0 . . .mksk such that
(mk, sk) = (m, s) we have that there is some i ≤ k and r, r′, r′′ such that
mi(sec
B
T ) = ABresBr,r′,r′′ . Hence, the TTP gets the resolve request from Bob
and will issue a valid contract. If Alice contacts the TTP by an abort request
or a resolve request after (m, s) she will get a contract issued by the TTP in
response. Consequently, Bob cannot prevent Alice from getting a contract.
2)⇒1): We show that if conditions i),ii), and iii) are satisfied state (m, s) is
βGJM-unbalanced. We have to show that Bob has two strategies a) a strategy to
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get a contract and b) a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a contract. The
strategy from Bob to prevent Alice from getting a contract is to do nothing. In
this case Alice will not get the promise of signature from Bob that she would need
to get a contract issued by the TTP and Alice will not get the signature from Bob
directly. The strategy for Bob to get a contract is to send an resolve request to the
TTP, i.e., send ABresBr,r′,r′′ for some r, r
′, r′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓ to the TTP. By condition
i) we know that Alice is in state (i, pos-sent), i.e., stateA(s) = (i, pos-sent). Thus,
Alice has not sent an abort request to the TTP, yet. Hence, if she sends her
abort request to the TTP in state (m, s), then, by the definition of the TTP
(Figure 6), the resolve request from Bob will take priority over the abort request
and the TTP will issue a contract to Bob. If Alice does not contact the TTP
in (m, s), then the TTP will also issue a contract to Bob. Thus, Bob will get a
contract and thus his strategy will succeed. 2
In a situation where Alice has just sent a promise of signature ABposA to the in-
truder, condition 2) of Lemma 4 is satisfied. Thus, as an immediate consequence
of Lemma 4 we obtain:
Theorem 4. The protocol GGJM is βGJM-unbalanced.
As in case of the ASW-protocol, we also obtain that the system is unbalanced
for the responder if the TTP gives priority to abort over resolvebe. If G ′GJM
denotes the corresponding system and β′GJM the corresponding balance specifier,
we obtain:
Theorem 5. The protocol G ′GJM is β′GJM-unbalanced.
7.2 GJM Protocol is Abuse-free
For abuse-freeness, we imagine that Charlie assumes that there is only one in-
stance of the GJM protocol running, but that he does not know whether Alice is
the initiator or responder, which is a realistic assumption. Formally, we replace
AA by a variant of it, denoted AA′ , which in the beginning decides whether
it wants to play the role of the initiator or the responder and then sends a
corresponding message to Bob, see pseudocode description in Figures 7 and
8. We set GeGJM = DY[{Ai}i∈{A,T}, {A′, T}, {B},K] with K as above, βeGJM =
({Ie}, viewI , ϕ̄A, ϕI), and X = {A,B, T, pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), pk(C), sk(C), text,
ok, pcsok, tpok, sok}. Here, Ie denotes the intruder of Ge. While here T gives pri-
ority to resolve over abort, we also consider the situation where T is replaced by
T ′ which gives priority to abort over resolve. The corresponding external view
is denoted by (G ′eASW, β
′e
ASW). We have:
Theorem 6 (GJM is abuse-free). The external views (GeGJM, βeGJM) and
(G′eGJM, β
′e
GJM) are X -abusive-free.
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In what follows for r ∈ T (Σ) we abbreviate pcs(r, sk(A), 〈c, 1〉, pk(B), pk(T ))
by PCSr and fake(r, sk(B), 〈c, 1〉, pk(A), pk(T )) by FAKEr.
For a state (m, s) of GeGJM and E ⊆ T (Σ) we say that the intruder knowledge
in state (m, s) is E if the set of messages the intruder can derive in (m, s) is
dS(E).
We now state several lemmas and use them to prove Theorem 6. The proof
of the lemmas then follow.
In the next Lemma the βeGJM-unbalanced states of GeGJM are characterised and
it is stated what kind of knowledge the intruder has in these βeGJM-unbalanced
states.
Lemma 8. a) Let (m, s) be a reachable state of GeGJM. Then the following two
conditions are equivalent:
1) (m, s) is βeGJM-unbalanced.
2) i) stateA(s) = (i, pos-sent) and
ii) m(netoutBA) 6= ABposBr for all r ∈ T (Σ)↓, and
iii) there is a run segment m0s0 . . .mksk such that (mk, sk) = (m, s)
and for all i ≤ k and r ∈ T (Σ)↓ we have mi(secBT ) 6= ABresBr.
b) Let (m, s) be a state of GeGJM that is βeGJM-unbalanced. Then the intruder
knowledge in (m, s) is (KI ∪{PCSr}) or (KI ∪{PCSr,BAabort-ackr′,r′′}) for
some r, r′, r′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓.
Lemma 9 states that if the intruder derives a message m from his knowledge
in an βeGJM-unbalanced state, then Charlie neither can derive the secret key of
Alice nor the secret key of the TTP from this message m.
Lemma 9. We have that
a) Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓. If m ∈ dS(KI∪{PCSr}), then X∪{m} is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free.
b) Let r, r′, r′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓. If m ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr,BAabort-ackr′,r′′}), then X ∪
{m} is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free.
The following Lemma states that if Charlie neither can derive the secret key
of Alice nor the secret key of the TTP from a message m, then for X -tests θ
and messages m there is an intruder randomness r ∈ RI such that if m passes
θ, then m|PCSr′→FAKEr↓ will also pass theta.
Lemma 10. Let θ be an X -test, m ∈ T (Σ)↓ such that X∪{m} is {sk(A), sk(T )}-
free, r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and r′ ∈ RI such that r′ 6∈ Sub(m). Then, m |= θ implies
m|PCSr→FAKEr′↓|= θ.
Lemma 11 shows that if the intruder can derive a message m from his knowl-
edge in an βeGJM-unbalanced state of GeGJM he can also derive some fake version
m|PCSr→FAKEr′ from this knowledge reduced by the message PCSr.
Lemma 11. Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓, r′ ∈ RI. Then, we have that
a) If m ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr}), then m|PCSr→FAKEr′↓∈ dS(KI).
b) For all u, v ∈ T (Σ)↓ we have that if m ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr,BAabort-acku,v}),
then m|PCSr→FAKEr′↓∈ dS(KI ∪ {BAabort-acku,v}).
Now we can prove Theorem 6.
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Proof: To show that GeGJM is βeGJM X -abuse-free according to Definition 12 it
suffices to show that there is no βeGJM-convincing X -test. We prove this by con-
tradiction. Assume that θ is a βGJM
e-convincing X -test. Then, by Definition
12 there is a θ-possible state (m, s) of GeGJM which is βeGJM-unbalanced. It suf-
fices to show that there is a θ-possible βeGJM-balanced state (m
′, s′) of GeGJM that
is not a descendant of an βeGJM-unbalanced state. For this let m
′′ be a mes-
sage that can be derived by the intruder in state (m, s) such that m′′ passes
θ. According to Lemma 8 part b) we know that m′′ ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr}) or
m′′ ∈ dS(KI ∪{PCSr,BAabort-acku,v}) for some r, u, v ∈ T (Σ)↓. We distinguish
between these two cases and show that in each of these cases there is a state
(m′, s′) with the conditions described above.
– m′′ ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr}) for some r ∈ T (Σ) ↓: Since m′′ is a finite term
there is r′ ∈ RI such that r′ 6∈ Sub(m). Then, by Lemma 9 and Lemma
10 we have that m′′|PCSr→FAKEr′ ↓ passes θ. By Lemma 11 we have that
m′′|PCSr→FAKEr′ ↓∈ dS(KI), so we can choose (m′, s′) to be the initial state
(m0, s0) of GeGJM. Since in (m0, s0) the intruder can derive m′′|PCSr→FAKEr′↓
state (m0, s0) is θ-possible and by Lemma 8 part a) we know that (m0, s0)
is βeGJM-balanced and (m0, s0) is obviously not a descendant of any β
e
GJM-
unbalanced state. So in this case we are done.
– m′′ ∈ dS(KI ∪{PCSr,BAabort-acku,v}) for some r, u, v ∈ T (Σ)↓: Since m′′ is
a finite term there is r′ ∈ RI such that r′ 6∈ Sub(m). Then by Lemma 9 and
Lemma 10 we have that m′′|PCSr→FAKEr′ ↓ passes θ. By Lemma 11 we have
that m′′|PCSr→FAKEr′ ↓∈ dS(KI ∪ {BAabort-acku,v}). We can choose (m′, s′)
to be the state of GeGJM that is reached starting at the initial state (m0, s0)
of GeGJM after the intruder has sent the abort request as initiator to the
TTP and got BAabort-ack back in response from the TTP. More formally,
consider the run segment m0s0m1s1m2s2, where (m0, s0) is the initial state
of GeGJM, stateA(s0) = stateA(s1) = stateA(s2) = 0, m1(secBT ) = BAabortv ,
m2(sec
T
B) = BAabort-acku,v, m1(p) = ◦ for all ports p 6= secBT of GeGJM, and
m2(p) = ◦ for all ports p 6= secTB of GeGJM. In state (m2, s2) the knowledge of
the intruder exactly is KI ∪{BAabort-acku,v}. By Lemma 8 part a) we know
that (mi, si) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} are βeGJM-balanced so we can choose (m′, s′) to
be (m2, s2) and we are done. 2
In the next sections we give the proofs of the above mentioned lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 8 Lemma 8 characterizes the set of unbalanced states of the
protocol that is assumed by Charlie. The proof of this lemma is similiar to the
proof of Lemma 4 which characterizes the unbalanced states of the protocol that
is actually run between Alice, Bob, and the TTP.
Proof of Lemma 8:
a) In the protocol GeGJM Bob is modelled by the intruder. Therefore, in the
following we write ‘Bob’ instead of ‘the intruder’.
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1)⇒2): We prove this implication by contraposition. First we show that if
stateA(s) 6= (i, pos-sent), then (m, s) is (I, view, ϕ1, ϕ2)-balanced. We distin-
guish between the possible values of stateA(s). For
stateA(s) ∈ {0, initiator, (i, sig-sent), (i, abort-req-sent), (i, aborted),
(i, resolve-req-sent), (i, contract), (i, resolved)}
the arguments are similar as in the corresponding cases of Lemma 4. Thus,
we only have to consider the values of stateA(s) that correspond to the
responder part for Alice:
• stateA(s) = responder: Bob does not have a strategy to get a contract
since Alice has the possibility to ignore a promise of signature from
Bob if she wants to abort the contract signing. More specifically, if
m′(netoutBA) = BAposBr for some r ∈ T (Σ)↓, m′ = m or a descen-
dant (m′, s′) of (m, s) such that stateA(s′) = responder, then Alice could
take the transition such that we have stateA(s
′′) = not-interested for the
successor (m′′, s′′) of (m′, s′). Since Alice neither has sent her promise
of signature nor her signature to Bob Bob neither can use the TTP to
resolve the contract singning nor he has the signature of Alice on the
contract and cannot derive this signature on his own (similar argument
as in case stateA(s) = 0 in Lemma 4). Thus, Bob does not have a strategy
to get a contract.
• stateA(s) = (r, pos-sent): If Alice receives Bobs signature in state (m, s),
then obviously, Bob does not have a strategy to prevent Alice from get-
ting a contract.
Otherwise, if Alice does not receive Bobs signature in state (m, s) but
Bob has sent his abort request as initiator to the TTP already, i.e.,
mi(sec
B
T ) = BAabortr for some i < k and r ∈ T (Σ)↓, then if Alice decides
to send an resolve request to the TTP, that is m′(secAT ) = ABresAr′,r′′,r′′′
for some r′, r′′, r′′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓ and stateA(s′) = (r, resolve-req-sent) for the
successor state (m′, s′) of (m, s), then if any Alice receives any message
from Bob later on she will not react on this message since she simply
waits for the response from the TTP to her resolve request. Since she did
not send her signature to Bob and Bob cannot derive Alices signature
on his own and the TTP has already aborted the contract signing Bob
does not have a strategy to get a contract.
And in case Alice does not receive Bobs signature in state (m, s) and
Bob has not sent his abort request to the TTP yet, Alice could send an
resolve request to the TTP, that is, m′(secAT ) = BAresAr′,r′′,r′′′ for some
r′, r′′, r′′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓ and stateA(s′) = (r, resolve-req-sent) for the successor
state (m′, s′) of (m, s) then the TTP will issue a contract in response,
note that a resolve request takes priority over an abort request sent by
Bob in state (m′, s′), so even if Bob has sent his abort request in (m′, s′)
the TTP will issue a contract. Hence, Bob does not have a strategy to
prevent Alice from getting a contract.
• stateA(s) = (r, resolve-req-sent): We know that m(secAT ) = BAresAr,r′,r′′
for some r, r′, r′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓. If for some i < k we have that mi(secBT ) =
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BAabortr′′′ for some r
′′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓, then Bob has no strategy to get a
contract anymore since the TTP will not resolve the contract signing and
Alice has not sent her signature to Bob explicitly and Bob cannot derive
Alices’ signature on the contract on his own. If Bob has not sent an abort
request yet, i.e., for all r′′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓ we have mi(secBT ) 6= BAabortr′′′ for
i < k then the TTP will issue a contract for Alice, note that even if
m(secBT ) = BAabortr′′′ for some r
′′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓ the resolve request from
Alice will take priority over the abort request from Bob. So Alice will
get a contract issued by the TTP and so Bob does not have a strategy
to prevent Alice from getting a contract.
• stateA(s) ∈ {(r, contract), (r, resolved)}: Alice has a contract so Bob does
not have a strategy to prevent Alice from getting a contract.
• stateA(s) = (r, aborted): Since the TTP has sent BAabort-ack message in
response to Alices resolve request Bob cannot use the TTP to get a valid
contract anymore. So Bob does not have a strategy to get a contract.
b) We know that stateA(s) = (i, pos-sent). If the intruder has sent an abort
request to the TTP and got an abort acknowledge message BAabort-ackr′,r′′
for some r′, r′′ ∈ T (Σ)↓ back in response it is easy to see that the knowledge
of the intruder in (m, s) is know(m, s) = KI ∪ {PCSr,BAabort-ackr′,r′′} for
some r ∈ T (Σ)↓. Otherwise, if the the intruder has not got an abort ac-
knowledge message from the TTP it is easy to see that the of the intruder
is KI ∪ {PCSr} for some r ∈ T (Σ)↓. 2
Proof of Lemma 9 In order to prove Lemma 9 we need a characterization of
the sets K ⊆ T (Σ) from which messages of the form sk(t) for t ∈ T (Σ)↓ can
be derived. The following lemma states that a message of the form sk(t) can be
derived from K iff sk(t) can be obtained by applying a sequence of projections
to some message m ∈ K, i.e., sk(t) = πκ for some κ ∈ {1, 2}∗.
Lemma 12. Let K ⊆ T (Σ)↓ and t ∈ T (Σ)↓. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
1) sk(t) 6∈ dS(K)
2) For all M ∈ K and p ∈ Pos(M) such that M |p = sk(t) there is a proper
prefix p′ of p such that root(M |p′) 6= 〈,〉.
Proof: Let m ∈ T (Σ)↓.
– 2)⇒ 1): Assume that 2) holds. We show by induction on the structure of N
that for every S-term N and each K-instance N̂ of N we have that {N̂↓}
satisfies condition 2). From this 1) follows immediately.
If N is a variable, then N̂ ∈ K and the claim follows directly from condition
2).
If N is of the form f(N1, . . . , Nl) for S-terms N1, . . . , Nl and N̂ is a K-
instance of N there are t1, . . . , tn ∈ K such that N̂=N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn],
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where {x1, . . . , xn} = V(N). Then we have
N̂↓= N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]↓
= f(N1, . . . , Nl)[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]↓
= f(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn], . . . , Nl[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn])↓
= f(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]↓, . . . , Nl[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]↓)↓ .
By induction we know that {N̂i} satisties condition 2) where
N̂i = Ni[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]↓ .
We need to show that {N̂↓} satisfies condition 2). We need to show that if
N̂↓ |p = sk(t), then there is a proper prefix p′ of p such that root(N̂↓ |p′) 6=
〈,〉. If f(N̂1, . . . , N̂l) is in normal form we have that N̂↓ satisfies condition
2) since N̂1, . . . , N̂l satisfy condition 2) and f 6= sk (note sk(x) 6∈ S). If
f(N̂1, . . . , N̂l) is not in normal form we know that
f ∈ {π1, π2, sconvert, tpconvert, sigcheck, pcsver, sver, tpver} :
Since N̂1, . . . , N̂l are in normal form, an H-identity that is applied to f(N̂1,
. . . , N̂l) is applied at the root position of f(N̂1, . . . , N̂l). We now distinguish
between the possible cases:
• f = π1: Then, we have that π1(N̂1) →H N̂ ↓ is π1(〈x, y〉) = x. So, we
have that N̂1 is of the form N̂1 = 〈u1, u2〉 and N̂↓= u1. Let N̂↓ |p = sk(t).
Then, we have that N̂1|1p = sk(t). By induction, it follows that there is
a proper prefix p′ of 1p such that root(N̂1|p′) 6= 〈,〉. Since root(N̂1) = 〈,〉
we know that p′ is of the form 1p′′ where p′′ is a proper prefix of p′. So,
〈,〉 6= root(N̂1|1p′′) = root(u1|p′′) = root(N̂↓).
• f = π2: Analogous argument.
• f ∈ {sigcheck, pcsver, sver, tpver}: Then, we have that N̂ ↓∈ {ok, pcsok,
sok, tpok} and thus, root(N̂↓) 6= 〈,〉.
– 1)⇒ 2): Easily shown by contraposition. 2
Now we can turn to the proof of Lemma 9 which states that the intruder cannot
derive a message from his knowledge in an unbalanced state of GeGJM from which
Charlie can derive the secret key from Alice or the TTP.
Proof of Lemma 9:
a) Let m ∈ dS(KI∪{PCSr}). We have to show that sk(A), sk(T ) 6∈ dS(X∪{m}).
It suffices to show that for K = X ∪ {m} and t ∈ {A, T} condition 2) of
Lemma 12 is satisfied.
For all M ∈ X and p ∈ Pos(M) we obviously have that if M |p = sk(t) there
is a proper prefix p′ of p such that root(M |p′) 6= 〈,〉.
For M = m we know that M ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr}). Since for all M ′ ∈
KI ∪{PCSr} and p ∈ Pos(M ′) we have that if M ′|p = sk(t) there is a proper
prefix p′ of p such that root(M ′|p′) 6= 〈,〉 we know by Lemma 12 (2) ⇒ 1))
that sk(t) 6∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr}). Since M ∈ dS(KI ∪ {PCSr}) we have that
dS(KI∪{PCSr,M}) = dS(KI∪{PCSr}) and so sk(t) 6∈ dS(KI∪{PCSr,M}).
By Lemma 12 (1)⇒ 2)) it follows that M satisfies the desired condition.
b) Analogously. 2
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Proof of Lemma 10 One of the main lemmas used in our proof of Theorem
6 is Lemma 10. It states that if from message m Charlie neither can derive the
secret key from Alice nor the secret key from the TTP, then Charlie cannot
perform a test θ such that m passes θ but the message m′ that is obtained from
m by replacing PCSr by a message of the form FAKEr′ does not pass θ. For the
proof of Lemma 10 we need a series of technical lemmas.
Lemma 13 states that if one applies anH-identity to an instance of an (S∪X )-
term, then one get an instance of some other (S ∪ X )-term of the same kind.
This statement is needed for proofs by induction in subsequent lemmas.
Lemma 13. LetM⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {sk(A), sk(T )}-free. Let N be an (S ∪X )-term.
Let N̂ be an M-instance of N . Let T ∈ T (Σ) such that N̂ →H T . Then T is an
M′-instance of some (S∪X )-term N ′, whereM′ ⊆ T (Σ)↓ is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free.
Proof: By induction on the size of position p ∈ N∗ we show that for each
{sk(A), sk(T )}-free M ⊆ T (Σ)↓, (S ∪ X )-term N , M-instance N̂ of N , and
T ∈ T (Σ) such that N̂ →pH T we have that T is an M′-instance of some
(S ∪ X )-term N ′ where M′ is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free and M⊆M′ ⊆ T (Σ)↓.
Since we have that M⊆ T (Σ)↓ we know that N is not a variable.
First, assume that p = ε. We distinguish between the possible root symbols
of N .
– root(N) ∈ {pk, 〈,〉, sig, fake, pcs}: This is not possible since there is no H-
identity with appropriate left-hand side.
– root(N) = π1: The H-identity that is applied in step N̂ →H T is π1(〈x, y〉) =
x so N̂ |1 is of the form N̂ |1 = 〈t1, t2〉 for some t1, t2 ∈ T (Σ). We distinguish
two cases.
• N |1 is a variable: Then we have that 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ M since N̂ is an M-
instance of N . Hence, T = t1 and obviously we have thatM′ =M∪{t1}
is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free. So, T is anM′-instance of the (S∪X )-term x1 ∈ V .
• N |1 is of the form N |1 = 〈t′1, t′2〉: Then we have that t′1 is an (S∪X )-term
and T = t1 is an M-instance of t′1.
– root(N) = π2: Analogous argument.
– root(N) ∈ {sigcheck, sver, tpver, pcsver}: Then, we have that T ∈ {ok, pcsok,
sok, tpok}. Hence, T is an M-instance of the (S ∪ X )-term T .
Now, assume that p is of the form p = ip′ for some p′ and N is of the form
N = f(t′1, . . . , t
′
l). Then, we have that N̂ is of the form N̂ = f(t1, . . . , tl) where
tj is an M-instance of t′j for j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We have that T is of the form
T = f(t1, . . . , tl) where tj = tj for j 6= i and ti →p
′
H ti. By induction, we have
that ti is anM′-instance of some (S∪X )-term t, whereM′ is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free
and M⊆M′ ⊆ T (Σ)↓. So T is an M′-instance of the (S ∪ X )-term N [t]i. 2
The next lemma states that if we instantiate an S term N by some terms
t1, . . . , tn from an {sk(A), sk(T )}-free set and then replace a message of the
form PCSr by some message of the form FAKEr′ we get the same term as if
we instantiate N by the terms t1|PCSr→FAKEr′ , . . . , tn|PCSr→FAKEr′ .
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Lemma 14. Let M ⊆ T (Σ) ↓ be {sk(A), sk(T )}-free and N an S-term. Let
r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and let r′ ∈ RI . Then for all t1, . . . , tn ∈M we have that
N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCSr→FAKEr′
=N [t1|PCSr→FAKEr′ , . . . , tn|PCSr→FAKEr′ /x1, . . . , xn],
where {x1, . . . , xn} = V(N).
Proof: In the following we will write PCS instead of PCSr and FAKE instead of
FAKEr′ . We prove this lemma by induction on the structure of N :
– N is a constant: We have N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn] = N for all t1, . . . , tn ∈
T (Σ) and N|PCS→FAKE = N .
– N = x for some variable x ∈ V : We have
N [m/x]|PCS→FAKE = m̂ = N [m̂/x]
where for t ∈ T (Σ) we denote t|PCS→FAKE by t̂ and we are done.
– N is of the form N = f(N1, . . . , Nl) for S-terms N1, . . . , Nl where f 6= pcs:
We have that
N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE
= f(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn], . . . , Nl[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn])|PCS→FAKE
= f(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE, . . . , Nl[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE)
and by induction we proceed
f(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE, . . . , Nl[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE)
= f(N1[t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn], . . . , Nl[t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn])
= f(N1, . . . , Nl)[t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn]
= N [t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn].
– N is of the form N = pcs(N1, N2, N3, N4, N5): By the fact that M is
{sk(A), sk(T )}-free we know that N2[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn] 6= sk(A) and so
we have
N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE
= pcs(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE, . . . , N4[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE)
and by induction
pcs(N1[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE, . . . , N4[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|PCS→FAKE)
= pcs(N1[t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn], . . . , N4[t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn])
= N [t̂1, . . . , t̂n/x1, . . . , xn].
2
One of the main lemmas needed in our proof of Lemma 10 is the following
one. It states that if we can get from an instance N̂ of a particular form of
some (S ∪ X )-term to a term T by applying a sequence of H-identities, then
we can get from N̂|PCS→FAKE to T|PCS→FAKE by applying a similar sequence of
H-identities. For this proof proof to work it is crucial that for the H-indentity
pcsver(w, pk(x), pk(y), pk(z), pcs(u, sk(x), w, pk(y), pk(z))) = pcsok there is a cor-
responding H-identity
pcsver(w, pk(x), pk(y), pk(z), fake(u, sk(y), w, pk(x), pk(z))) = pcsok.
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Lemma 15. Let M ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {sk(A), sk(T )}-free. Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and let
r′ ∈ RI . Then, for all (S ∪ X )-terms N , M-instances N̂ of N , and T ∈ T (Σ)
we have that N̂
∗→H T implies N̂|PCSr→FAKEr′
∗→H T|PCSr→FAKEr′ .
Proof: In the following we will write PCS instead of PCSr and FAKE instead of
FAKEr′ . We show the lemma by induction on the size of N̂ .
If N̂ is a constant we have that N̂|PCS→FAKE = N̂ = T = T|PCS→FAKE = T .
Now, let N̂ be of the form N̂ = f(t1, . . . , tl). If T = N̂ we are done. Otherwise,
there is N ∈ T (Σ) such that
N̂ →pH N
∗→H T
for some p ∈ Pos(N̂). We consider different cases for p:
– p = ε: We know that N is not a variable since M⊆ T (Σ)↓. We distinguish
between the possible root symbols of N̂ .
• root(N̂) = π1: We know that N̂ is of the form N̂ = π1(〈t1, t2〉), N = t1,
and N is of the form N = π1(t) for some (S ∪ X )-term t. We have that
|N | = |t1| < |N̂ | and by Lemma 13 we know that N is anM′-instance of




We now have to show that
N̂|PCS→FAKE
∗→H t1|PCS→FAKE.
We have that N̂ →H t1 by applying the identity π1(〈x, y〉) = x at the
root of N̂ . Hence, there is a substitution σ such that N̂ = σ(π1(〈x, y〉))
and σ(x) = t1. With σ̂(x) = σ(x)|PCS→FAKE and σ̂(y) = σ(y)|PCS→FAKE
we have that N̂|PCS→FAKE = σ̂(π1(〈x, y〉)) and t1|PCS→FAKE = σ̂(x).
• root(N̂) = π2: Analogous argument.
• root(N̂) = pcsver: We have that T = pcsok and N̂ is of the form N̂ =
pcsver(t1, t2, t3, t4, t5). If t5 6= PCS the argument is similar as in the
previous cases. If t5 = PCS we have that
N̂|PCS→FAKE = pcsver(text, pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ),FAKE)
and thus we can apply the H-identity
pcsver(w, pk(x), pk(y), pk(z), fake(v, sk(y), w, pk(x), pk(z))) = pcsok
to show that N̂|PCS→FAKE →H pcsok = T|PCS→FAKE.
• root(N̂) ∈ {sig, pk, sk, 〈,〉, fake, pcs}: Impossible since there is no H-iden-
tity with an appropriate left-hand side.
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• root(N̂) = sigcheck: We have that T = ok and
N̂ = σ(sigcheck(x, sig(v, sk(y), x), pk(y)))
for some substitution σ. Then it is easy to see that
N̂|PCS→FAKE = σ̂(sigcheck(x, sig(v, sk(y), x), pk(y)))
where σ̂(z) = σ(z)|PCS→FAKE for all z ∈ dom(σ). Thus, we have that
N̂|PCS→FAKE →H ok = T|PCS→FAKE.
• root(N̂) ∈ {sver, tpver}: Analogous argument.
– p = ip′ for some i: We know that N is no variable since M ⊆ T (Σ) ↓.
Thus, N is of the form N = f(t′1, . . . , t
′
l) for some (S ∪ X )-terms t′1, . . . , t′l.
We have that N is of the form N = f(t1, . . . , tl), where tj = tj for j 6= i
and ti →H ti. By induction, we know that ti|PCS→FAKE ∗→H ti|PCS→FAKE. By
Lemma 13 we have that N is an M′-instance of some (S ∪ X )-term N ′ for
some {sk(A), sk(T )}-free set M′ ⊆ T (Σ)↓. Since the size of N is smaller
than the size of N̂ (by definition of H), by induction we have that
N |PCS→FAKE
∗→H T|PCS→FAKE.
Using Lemma 14 it is easy to see that
N̂|PCS→FAKE = f(t1|PCS→FAKE, . . . , tl|PCS→FAKE).
Thus, we have that
N̂|PCS→FAKE →pH N |PCS→FAKE
∗→H T|PCS→FAKE.
2
The preceding lemmas said something about how replacing a term of the
form PCSr by a term of the form FAKEr′ in a message m affect the instantiation
of (S∪X )-terms and the application of H-identities. The following three lemmas
are their counterparts for the converse replacement, i.e., the replacement of a
term of the form FAKEr′ by a term PCSr and how this replacement affects
instantiation of (S ∪ X )-terms and the application of H-identities. The proofs
of these lemmas is very similar to the corresponding preceding lemmas and are
therefor omitted.
Lemma 16. Let r ∈ RI . Let M ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {r}-free. Let N be an (S ∪ X )-
term. Let N̂ be an M-instance of N . Let T ∈ T (Σ) such that N̂ →H T . Then
T is an M′-instance of some (S ∪ X )-term N ′, where M′ ⊆ T (Σ)↓ is {r}-free.
The following lemma corresponds to Lemma 14 and it is proven in the same
way as Lemma 14.
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Lemma 17. Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓. Let r′ ∈ RI Let M ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {r′}-free and N
an S-term. Then for all t1, . . . , tn ∈M we have that
N [t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn]|FAKEr′→PCSr
=N [t1|FAKEr′→PCSr , . . . , tn|FAKEr′→PCSr/x1, . . . , xn],
where {x1, . . . , xn} = V(N).
The following lemma corresponds to Lemma 18 and it is proven in the same
way as Lemma 18.
Lemma 18. Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and r′ ∈ RI . Let M ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {r′}-free. Then
for all (S ∪ X )-terms N , M-instances N̂ of N , and T ∈ T (Σ) we have that
N̂
∗→H T implies N̂|FAKEr′→PCSr
∗→H T|FAKEr′→PCSr .
Lemma 19 states that if one first replace a term of the form FAKEr′ by a
term of the form PCSr in a message m and after this replace in the resulting
message PCSr by FAKEr′ one gets the original message m if some properties are
satisfied. The proof of this lemma is obvious.
Lemma 19. Let m ∈ T (Σ)↓. Let r ∈ RI such that r 6∈ Sub(m). Then for all
t ∈ T (Σ)↓ we have that (m|PCSr→FAKEr′ )|FAKEr′→PCSr = m.
The following lemma states for atomic (S ∪ X )-tests that under certain as-
sumptions if a message m passes θ, then the message m′ that is constructed from
m by replacing a term of the form PCSr by a term FAKEr′ (or vice versa) also
passes θ.
Lemma 20. Let m ∈ T (Σ)↓. Let θ be an atomic (S ∪ X )-test. Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓
and let r′ ∈ RI.
a) If X ∪ {m} is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free, then m |= θ implies m|PCSr→FAKE−r′↓|= θ.
b) If X ∪ {m} is {r′}-free, then m |= θ implies m|FAKEr′→PCSr↓|= θ.
Proof: In the following we will write PCS instead of PCSr and FAKE instead of
FAKEr′ .
a) Assume m |= θ. It suffices to show that m̂ = m|PCS→FAKE passes θ. Let M,N
be simple (S ∪ X )-terms such that θ = (M,N). We have to show that
M [m̂/x] ≡H N [m̂/x].
Since m passes θ we know that
M [m/x] ≡H N [m/x],
and hence, we know that M [m/x]
∗→H m′ and N [m/x] ∗→H m′ for somem′ ∈
T (Σ)↓. By Lemma 15 we know that M [m/x]|PCS→FAKE
∗→H m′|PCS→FAKE and
N [m/x]|PCS→FAKE
∗→H m′|PCS→FAKE. Hence, we have M [m/x]|PCS→FAKE ≡H
N [m/x]|PCS→FAKE. By Lemma 14 we have M [m/x]|PCS→FAKE = M [m̂/x] and
N [m/x]|PCS→FAKE = N [m̂/x]. Thus, m̂ |= θ.
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b) Assume m |= θ. It suffices to show that m̂ = m|FAKE→PCS passes θ. Let M,N
be simple (S ∪ X )-terms such that θ = (M,N). We have to show that
M [m̂/x] ≡H N [m̂/x].
Since m passes θ we know that
M [m/x] ≡H N [m/x],
and hence, we know that M [m/x]
∗→H m′ and N [m/x] ∗→H m′ for somem′ ∈
T (Σ)↓. By Lemma 18 we know that M [m/x]|FAKE→PCS
∗→H m′|FAKE→PCS and
N [m/x]|FAKE→PCS
∗→H m′|FAKE→PCS. Hence, we have M [m/x]|FAKE→PCS ≡H
N [m/x]|FAKE→PCS. By Lemma 17 we have M [m/x]|FAKE→PCS = M [m̂/x] and
N [m/x]|FAKE→PCS = N [m̂/x]. Thus, m̂ |= θ.
2
Now, we can turn to the proof of Lemma 10.
Proof of Lemma 10: Let θ be an (S ∪ X )-test, m ∈ T (Σ)↓ such that X ∪ {m}
is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free, r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and r′ ∈ RI such that r′ 6∈ Sub(m).
Since θ is a (infinite) boolean combination of atomic (S ∪X )-tests it suffices
to show that for every atomic (S ∪ X )-test θ′ we have we have that m |= θ′ iff
m|PCSr→FAKEr′ |= θ′. First, assume that m |= θ′. Then, by Lemma 20a) we get
m|PCSr→FAKEr′ |= θ.
Now, assume that m|PCSr→FAKEr′ |= θ′. Then, by Lemma 20b) we get
(m|PCSr→FAKEr′ )|FAKEr′→PCSr
|= θ′.
By Lemma 19 we have (m|PCSr→FAKEr′ )|FAKEr′→PCSr
= m. 2
Proof of Lemma 11 The following Lemma is slightly more general than
Lemma 11. It gives a sufficient condition for a set E ⊆ T (Σ) ↓ that allows
to conclude that whenever a message m is derivable from E the message m′ that
is constructed from m by replacing a term of the form PCSr by a term FAKEr′
can be derived from E|PCSr→FAKEr′ .
Lemma 21. Let E ⊆ T (Σ)↓ be {sk(A), sk(T )}-free. Let r ∈ T (Σ)↓ and let
r′ ∈ RI. Then, m ∈ dS(E)↓ implies m|PCSr→FAKEr′↓∈ dS(E|PCSr→FAKEr′ ).
Proof: Let m ∈ dS(E)↓. Then there is an S-term N and an E-instance N̂ of N
such that N̂ →∗H m. According to Lemma 15 we have that N̂|PCSr→FAKEr′ →∗H
m|PCSr→FAKEr′ and using Lemma 14 we can conclude that N̂|PCSr→FAKEr′ is an
E|PCSr→FAKEr′ -instance of N , so m|PCSr→FAKEr′ ∈ dS(E|PCSr→FAKEr′ ). 2
Now we can prove Lemma 11.
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Proof of Lemma 11:
a) Let m ∈ dS(KI∪{PCSr}). Since for K = KI∪{PCSr} and t ∈ {A, T} condi-
tion 2) of Lemma 12 is satisfied, by Lemma 12 we obtain that sk(A), sk(T ) 6∈
dS(KI ∪{PCSr}), and hence, KI ∪{PCSr} is {sk(A), sk(T )}-free. By Lemma
21, we have that m|PCSr→FAKEr′ ↓∈ dS(KI ∪ {FAKEr′}). Since FAKEr′ ∈
dS(KI) we have that m|PCSr→FAKEr′↓∈ dS(KI).
b) Similar argument as in a). 2
8 Conclusion
We have proposed a new definition of abuse-freeness which involves as key fea-
tures (i) a specifically designed notion of test performed by the outside party
and (ii) a formalization of the assumptions of the outside party by the notion of
external view. We have applied our definition to the ASM and GJM protocol,
where for the latter protocol we have developed an equational theory to describe
the semantics of private contract signatures.
In view of the results in [1, 8, 11], an interesting question is whether abuse-
freeness as defined in this paper is decidable.
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// decide nondeterministically whether Alice wants to participate in the protocol or not
stateA = 0:
– stateA = 0
– stateA = initiator
// Alice can decide to send her promise of signature to Bob at any time
stateA = initiator:
– stateA = initiator
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
NA = newnonce()
m1 = 〈pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), text, hash(NA)〉
s1 = sig(sk(A),m1)
me1 = 〈m1, s1〉
netinAB = me1
// receive promise of signature from Bob
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
π1(π1(netout
B





A), pk(B)) = ok:





// receive signature from Bob
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
hash(netoutBA) = π2(π1(me2)):
– stateA = (i, contract)
// decide to abort
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
( π1(π1(netout
B





A), pk(B)) 6= ok: )
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
– stateA = (i, abort-req-sent)
m2 = 〈aborted,me1〉
ma1 = 〈m2, sig(sk(A),m2)〉
secAT = ma1
// receive abort confirmation from TTP
stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) and
π1(sec
T






– stateA = (i, aborted)
// receive replacement contract from TTP
stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) and
π1(π1(sec
T
A)) = me1 and
π1(π1(π2(π1(sec
T










A), pk(T )) = ok
– stateA = (i, resolved)
// resolve request
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
hash(netoutBA) 6= π2(π1(me2)):
– stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent)
secAT = 〈me1,me2〉
// receive replacement contract from TTP
stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent) and
π1(sec
T





A), pk(T )) = ok
– stateA = (i, resolved)
Fig. 1. This is the pseudocode description of Alice in the ASW-protocol
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status for instance status for instance DB-action for instance
〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉 from A from B 〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉 to A to B 〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉
⊥ ABabort ◦ aborted ABabort-ack ◦ store ABabort-ack
⊥ ABresA ◦ resolved ABrepl-contract ◦ store ABrepl-contract
⊥ ◦ ABresB resolved ◦ ABrepl-contract store ABrepl-contract
⊥ ABabort ABresB resolved ABrepl-contract ABrepl-contract store ABrepl-contract
⊥ ABresA ABresB resolved ABrepl-contract ABrepl-contract store ABrepl-contract
aborted ABabort ◦ aborted stored value ◦
aborted ABresA ◦ aborted stored value ◦
aborted ◦ ABresB aborted ◦ stored value
aborted ABabort ABresB aborted stored value stored value
aborted ABresA ABresB aborted stored value stored value
resolved ABabort ◦ resolved stored value ◦
resolved ABresA ◦ resolved stored value ◦
resolved ◦ ABresB resolved ◦ stored value
resolved ABabort ABresB resolved stored value stored value
resolved ABresA ABresB resolved stored value stored value
Fig. 2. This is TTP of the ASW-protocol described as a transition table
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// decide nondeterministically whether Alice wants to participate in the protocol and in which role
stateA = 0:
– stateA = 0
– stateA = responder
netinAB = responder
– stateA = initiator
netinAB = initiator
// Alice can decide to send her promise of signature to Bob at any time
stateA = initiator:
– stateA = initiator
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
NA = newnonce()
m1 = 〈pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), text, hash(NA)〉
s1 = sig(sk(A),m1)
me1 = 〈m1, s1〉
netinAB = me1
// receive promise of signature from Bob
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
π1(π1(netout
B





A), pk(B)) = ok:





// receive signature from Bob
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
hash(netoutBA) = π2(π1(me2)):
– stateA = (i, contract)
// decide to abort
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
( π1(π1(netout
B





A), pk(B)) 6= ok: )
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
– stateA = (i, abort-req-sent)
m2 = 〈aborted,me1〉
ma1 = 〈m2, sig(sk(A),m2)〉
secAT = ma1
// receive abort confirmation from TTP
stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) and
π1(sec
T






– stateA = (i, aborted)
// receive replacement contract from TTP
stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) and
π1(π1(sec
T
A)) = me1 and
π1(π1(π2(π1(sec
T










A), pk(T )) = ok
– stateA = (i, resolved)
// resolve request
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
hash(netoutBA) 6= π2(π1(me2)):
– stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent)
secAT = 〈me1,me2〉
// receive replacement contract from TTP
stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent) and
π1(sec
T





A), pk(T )) = ok
– stateA = (i, resolved)
Fig. 3. This is the pseudocode description of Alice in the ASW-protocol as assumed
by Charlie (initiator part)
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// Alice responds to promise of signature from Bob in the responder role
stateA = responder and
π1(π1(netout
B
A)) = pk(B) and
π1(π2(π1(netout
B
A))) = pk(A) and
π1(π2(π2(π1(netout
B
A)))) = pk(T ) and
π1(π2(π2(π2(π1(netout
B





A), pk(B)) = ok
– stateA = not-interested





m1 = 〈me1, hash(NA)〉
s1 = sig(sk(A),m1)
me2 = 〈m1, s1〉
netinAB = me2
// receive signature from Bob and send own signature




– stateA = (r, contract)
// send resolve request
stateA = (r, pos-sent) and
π2(π2(π2(π2(π1(me1))))) 6= hash(netoutBA)
– stateA = (r, pos-sent)
– stateA = (r, resolve-req-sent)
m2 = 〈me1,me2〉
s2 = sig(sk(A),m2)
mr1 = 〈m2, s2〉
secAT = mr1
// receive replacement contract
stateA = (r, resolve-req-sent) and
π1(sec
T





A), pk(T )) = ok
– stateA = (r, resolved)
// receive abort message
stateA = (r, resolve-req-sent) and
π1(π1(sec
T










A), pk(T )) = ok
– stateA = (r, aborted)
Fig. 4. This is the pseudocode description of Alice in the ASW-protocol as assumed
by Charlie (responder part)
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// Alice decides she wants to participate in the protocol or not
stateA = 0:
– stateA = 0
– stateA = initiator
// Alice can decide to send her promise of signature to Bob at any time
stateA = initiator:
– stateA = initiator
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
m1 = 〈c, 1〉
p1 = pcs(random(), sk(A),m1, pk(B), pk(T ))
me1 = 〈m1, p1〉
netinAB = me1
// Alice receives promise of signature from Bob and sends her signature
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
pcsver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) = pcsok and π1(netout
B
A) = 〈c, 2〉:




m2 = 〈c, 1〉
s2 = sconvert(random(), sk(A), p1)
me3 = 〈m2, s2〉
netinAB = me3
// Alice receives signature from Bob
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
sver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) = sok and π1(netout
B
A) = 〈c, 2〉:
– stateA = (i, contract)
// Alice sends abort request to TTP
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
(pcsver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) 6= pcsok or π1(netoutBA) 6= 〈c, 2〉):
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
– stateA = (i, abort-req-sent)
m3 = 〈text, pk(A), pk(B), aborted〉
s3 = sig(random(), sk(A),m3)
ma1 = 〈m3, s3〉
secAT = ma1
// Alice receives abort confirmation from TTP





A), pk(T )) = ok and π1(sec
T
A) = ma1
– stateA = (i, aborted)
// Alice receives resolved contract from TTP in response to abort request
stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) and
sver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = sok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 2〉
– stateA = (i, resolved)
// Alice sends resolve request to TTP
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
(sver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) 6= sok or π1(netoutBA) 6= 〈c, 2〉):
– stateA = (i, sig-sent)
– stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent)
m4 = 〈c, 1〉
s4 = sconvert(random(), sk(A), p1)
mr1 = 〈m4, s4, π2(me2)〉
secAT = mr1
// Alice receives resolved contract from TTP
stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent) and
((sver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = sok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 2〉) or
(tpver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = tpok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 2〉))
– stateA = (i, resolved)
Fig. 5. This is the pseudocode description of Alice (initiator), in the GJM-protocol
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status for instance status for instance DB-action for instance
〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉 from A from B 〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉 to A to B 〈text, pk(A), pk(B)〉
⊥ ABabort ◦ aborted ABabort-ack ◦ store ABabort-ack
⊥ ABresA ◦ resolved ABttpB ◦ store ABcontractA
⊥ ◦ ABresB resolved ◦ ABttpA store ABcontractB
⊥ ABabort ABresB resolved ABcontractB ABcontractA store ABcontractB
⊥ ABresA ABresB resolved ABcontractB ABcontractA store ABcontractB
aborted ABabort ◦ aborted stored value ◦
aborted ABresA ◦ aborted stored value ◦
aborted ◦ ABresB aborted ◦ stored value
aborted ABabort ABresB aborted stored value stored value
aborted ABresA ABresB aborted stored value stored value
resolved ABabort ◦ resolved stored value ◦
resolved ABresA ◦ resolved stored value ◦
resolved ◦ ABresB resolved ◦ stored value
resolved ABabort ABresB resolved stored value stored value
resolved ABresA ABresB resolved stored value stored value
Fig. 6. This is the description of the TTP in the GJM-protocol described as a transition
table
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// decide nondeterministically whether Alice wants to participate in the protocol and in which role
stateA = 0:
– stateA = 0
– stateA = responder
netinAB = responder
– stateA = initiator
netinAB = initiator
// Alice can decide to send her promise of signature to Bob at any time
stateA = initiator:
– stateA = initiator
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
m1 = 〈c, 1〉
p1 = pcs(random(), sk(A),m1, pk(B), pk(T ))
me1 = 〈m1, p1〉
netinAB = me1
// Alice receives promise of signature from Bob and sends her signature
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
pcsver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) = pcsok and π1(netout
B
A) = 〈c, 2〉:




m2 = 〈c, 1〉
s2 = sconvert(random(), sk(A), p1)
me3 = 〈m2, s2〉
netinAB = me3
// Alice receives signature from Bob
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
sver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) = sok and π1(netout
B
A) = 〈c, 2〉:
– stateA = (i, contract)
// Alice sends abort request to TTP
stateA = (i, pos-sent) and
(pcsver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) 6= pcsok or π1(netoutBA) 6= 〈c, 2〉):
– stateA = (i, pos-sent)
– stateA = (i, abort-req-sent)
m3 = 〈text, pk(A), pk(B), aborted〉
s3 = sig(random(), sk(A),m3)
ma1 = 〈m3, s3〉
secAT = ma1
// Alice receives abort confirmation from TTP





A), pk(T )) = ok and π1(sec
T
A) = ma1
– stateA = (i, aborted)
// Alice receives resolved contract from TTP in response to abort request
stateA = (i, abort-req-sent) and
sver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = sok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 2〉
– stateA = (i, resolved)
// Alice sends resolve request to TTP
stateA = (i, sig-sent) and
(sver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) 6= sok or π1(netoutBA) 6= 〈c, 2〉):
– stateA = (i, sig-sent)
– stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent)
m4 = 〈c, 1〉
s4 = sconvert(random(), sk(A), p1)
mr1 = 〈m4, s4, π2(me2)〉
secAT = mr1
// Alice receives resolved contract from TTP
stateA = (i, resolve-req-sent) and
((sver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = sok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 2〉) or
(tpver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = tpok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 2〉))
– stateA = (i, resolved)
Fig. 7. This is the pseudocode description of Alice in the GJM-protocol as assumed
by Charlie (initiator part)
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// Alice responds to promise of signature from Bob in the responder role
stateA = responder and
pcsver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(A), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) = pcsok and π1(netout
B
A) = 〈c, 1〉:
– stateA = not-interested




m1 = 〈c, 2〉
p1 = pcs(random(), sk(A),m1, pk(B), pk(T ))
me2 = 〈m1, p1〉
netinAB = me2
// Alice receives signature from Bob and sends her own signature in response
stateA = (r, pos-sent) and
sver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) = sok and π1(netout
B
A) = 〈c, 1〉:
– stateA = (r, contract)
m2 = 〈c, 1〉
s2 = sconvert(random(), sk(A), p1)
me4 = 〈m2, s2〉
netinAB = me4
// Alice sends resolve request to TTP
stateA = (r, pos-sent) and
(sver(π1(netout
B
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(netout
B
A)) 6= sok or π1(netoutBA) 6= 〈c, 1〉):
– stateA = (r, pos-sent)
– stateA = (r, resolve-req-sent)
m3 = 〈c, 1〉
s3 = sconvert(random, sk(A), p1)
mr1 = 〈m3, s3, π2(me1)〉
secAT = mr1
// Alice receives resolved contract from TTP
stateA = (r, resolve-req-sent) and
((sver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(secout
T
A)) = sok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 1〉) or
(tpver(π1(sec
T
A), pk(B), pk(T ), π2(sec
T
A)) = tpok and π1(sec
T
A) = 〈c, 1〉))
– stateA = (r, resolved)
// Alice receives abort acknowlege message from TTP in response to her resolve request





A), pk(T )) = ok and
π1(π1(π1(sec
T
A))) = text and
π1(π2(π1(π1(sec
T
A)))) = pk(B) and
π1(π2(π2(π1(π1(sec
T
A))))) = pk(A) and
π2(π2(π2(π1(π1(sec
T





A)), pk(B)) = ok
– stateA = (r, aborted)
Fig. 8. This is the pseudocode description of Alice in the GJM-protocol as assumed
by Charlie (responder part)
